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HILARY J. ALLEN 
For all the ink that has been spilled on the topic of financial 
regulation since the financial crisis of 2007–2008, there has been little 
examination of the competing normative goals of financial regulation. 
Should the financial system be treated as an end in itself, such that the 
efficiency of that system is the primary goal? Or should financial 
regulation instead treat the financial system as a means to the end of 
broader economic growth? This Article argues for the latter 
approach, and stakes out the controversial normative position that 
financial stability, rather than efficiency, should be the paramount 
focus of financial regulation. Having fixed upon this normative 
foundation, this Article is in a position to evaluate Dodd–Frank’s 
creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, a body intended 
to bring the United States’ financial regulators together for the 
purpose of identifying and responding to threats to financial stability. 
This Article argues that there are significant flaws in the FSOC’s 
structure and mandate that will limit its ability to discharge this vital 
task. Whilst the FSOC is currently the subject of legislative reform 
proposals, these proposals seek to hobble the FSOC’s powers. This 
Article argues that reform should instead swing in the other direction. 
What is needed is an effective and independent regulator with the 
resources and mandate to take a proactive, long-term, and creative 
approach to the promotion of financial stability. This Article therefore 
explores potential reforms to the United States financial regulatory 
architecture—ranging from the incremental to the more drastic and 
designed to improve commitment to financial stability. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For all the ink that has been spilled on the topic of financial regulation 
since the financial crisis of 2007–2008 (the Financial Crisis), there are some 
fundamental matters that have been left largely untouched by the legal 
scholarship. In particular, the tensions between the competing normative goals 
that animate financial regulation have gone largely unexplored.1 This Article 
wades into these waters, and considers whether financial regulators should 
focus principally on the efficiency of the financial sector, or instead make 
financial stability their paramount goal—reflecting a primary concern for the 
broader economic growth that the financial sector facilitates (and harms). This 
Article concludes that financial stability should take precedence over 
efficiency in terms of regulatory goals, and an acceptance of this conclusion 
begs another undertheorized question: Is the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (commonly known as the FSOC), established by the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank) in order “to 
respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial 
system,” up to such a critical task?2 This Article thus looks in detail at the 
FSOC’s powers, structure, and mandate, in order to assess its potential to 
actually mitigate threats to financial stability. 
The United States’ financial system is regulated by an alphabet soup of 
different regulatory agencies,3 and it became apparent during the Financial 
                                                                                                                     
 1 For a rare and thoughtful consideration of these normative themes, see generally 
David A. Westbrook, Rethinking Financial Markets: A Conference from the WEA 
Problematique, WORLD ECON. ASS’N (2012), http://rfconference2012.weaconferences.net/ 
problematique/ [http://perma.cc/34AG-KFZ2]. 
 2 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 112(a)(1)(C), 12 
U.S.C. § 5322(a)(1)(C) (2012) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank Act]. 
 3 For a list of these agencies, see infra note 167 and accompanying text. 
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Crisis that none of these agencies saw “its job as protecting the economy and 
financial system as a whole.”4 The FSOC was formed in 2010 as one response 
to this problem5: it is a council populated by the heads of the various federal 
financial regulatory agencies,6 and directed to monitor and address threats to 
financial stability.7 The FSOC was not particularly contentious at the time it 
was first created, but it has become a political hot potato in the past few years, 
with both the mutual fund and insurance industries seeking to challenge the 
FSOC’s authority to subject them to heightened regulatory scrutiny.8 
Prompted by such controversy, several bills have been introduced that propose 
to restructure the FSOC.9 Unfortunately, the aim of such legislative reform is 
to retrofit the FSOC in a way that creates a bias against proactive financial 
stability regulation and increasingly politicizes the council.10 This Article 
argues that while the FSOC should indeed be restructured, such restructuring 
should move in the opposite direction and have the goal of making the FSOC a 
more effective financial stability regulator, particularly by making it less 
susceptible to the cycle of political economy.11 
Public attention to the importance of financial stability tends to be 
cyclical—waxing during a crisis and waning as the economy starts to 
recover.12 As a result, regulators are likely to lack public support for their 
efforts to promote financial stability unless the system is in crisis mode.13 This 
                                                                                                                     
 4 THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 2 (2009)  
[hereinafter OBAMA WHITE PAPER], http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/ 
FinalReport_web.pdf [http://perma.cc/KUR6-YQDK]. 
 5 “The broad membership of the council is intended to limit the tendency of 
regulators to focus narrowly on the institutions and markets within their jurisdictions while 
overlooking risks from interdependencies that cut across jurisdictions.” Ben S. Bernanke, 
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago 47th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, 
Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision and Regulation 5 (May 5, 2011) 
(transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke 
20110505a.pdf [http://perma.cc/QE3W-57Q6]). 
 6 Dodd–Frank Act § 111(b)(1). 
 7 § 112(a). 
 8 Specifically, these industries are seeking to challenge the FSOC’s authority to 
subject non-bank financial institutions to heightened levels of supervision by the Federal 
Reserve. Floyd Norris, Financial Crisis, Over and Already Forgotten, N.Y. TIMES  
(May 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/business/the-financial-crisis-already-
forgotten.html [http://perma.cc/2DTS-W35R]. For a discussion of the designation process, 
see infra text accompanying notes 172–75. 
 9 See, e.g., S. 107, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 4387, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 10 See infra text accompanying notes 272–79. 
 11 See infra Part V. 
 12 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd–Frank: Why Financial Reform 
Tends to Be Frustrated and Systematic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1020–
21 (2012). 
 13 Id. 
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can make it difficult for regulators to overcome concentrated efforts by the 
financial industry to avoid and strip away the constraints of financial stability 
regulation over time. However, the potentially grave consequences of financial 
instability (and the social costs of ex post measures intended to mitigate its 
fallout) militate against regulators ignoring financial stability issues until a 
crisis occurs and the public cares about financial stability once more.14 The 
FSOC, as the only regulatory body with a statutory direction to address threats 
to financial stability, should therefore be designed in a way that insulates it as 
much as possible from this political economy cycle. Unfortunately, both the 
FSOC’s structure and its mandate are flawed in ways that increase the 
susceptibility of financial stability regulation to the vagaries of political 
economy.15 
Given the uncertainty inherent in financial stability regulation, it is 
important that regulators have a solid mandate that legitimizes, and affords 
them some leeway with regard to, their attempts to preserve financial 
stability.16 While the FSOC’s mandate does include “identify[ing] risks to the 
financial stability of the United States” and “respond[ing] to emerging threats 
to the stability of the United States financial system,”17 because the term 
“financial stability” is not defined in Dodd–Frank, the FSOC’s mandate is less 
robust than it could be. Certainly, there is a shared sense that we want to 
prevent financial institutions from collapsing and causing damage to the 
broader economy,18 but this “know-it-when-I-see-it” approach to financial 
stability provides limited guidance to the FSOC, and this lack of definition 
opens up the FSOC’s actions to challenge by the financial industry (through 
lobbying, capture, and judicial review).19 
                                                                                                                     
 14 See infra Part II. 
 15 See infra Part IV. 
 16 Errors are unavoidable in a system as complex as the financial system, which is 
characterized by Knightian uncertainty. Nonetheless, financial stability regulation is not 
doomed to failure. As former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke put it: 
Our continuing challenge is to make financial crises far less likely and, if they 
happen, far less costly. The task is complicated by the reality that every financial 
panic has its own unique features that depend on a particular historical context and the 
details of the institutional setting. But . . . one can, by stripping away the idiosyncratic 
aspects of individual crises, hope to reveal the common elements. . . . The challenge 
for policymakers is to identify and isolate the common factors of crises, thereby 
allowing us to prevent crises when possible and to respond effectively when not. 
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the 
Fourteenth Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, The Crisis as a Classical Financial 
Panic 8 (Nov. 8, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/bernanke20131108a.htm [http://perma.cc/YF9S-7AHM]). 
 17 Dodd–Frank Act § 112(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(1) (2012). 
 18 William A. Allen & Geoffrey Wood, Defining and Achieving Financial Stability, 2 
J. FIN. STABILITY 152, 152–53 (2006). 
 19 See infra text accompanying notes 295–302. 
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The key structural concern regarding the FSOC is that while it has been 
given an express mandate to pursue financial stability, the agencies led by its 
members have not: because the FSOC is a council rather than a body with 
substantial staff of its own, if the financial regulatory agencies represented on 
the FSOC are not concerned with financial stability issues, then a council of 
those agencies is unlikely to be effective in pursuing financial stability.20 This 
Article concludes that, at present, these other federal financial regulatory 
agencies (with the possible exception of the Federal Reserve) have only 
nebulous responsibility for financial stability concerns, and this responsibility 
is easily shirked when the economy is booming and regulatory intervention 
has become unpalatable.21 Unless there is a way to focus and maintain the 
attention of these agencies on financial stability, the FSOC will be unable to 
leverage their expertise, and its efficacy will be limited. 
Although the Federal Reserve (which is one of the agencies represented on 
the FSOC)22 has shown an inclination to fill the breach and take de facto 
responsibility for financial stability issues, this is not a uniformly positive 
development. The Federal Reserve has a tendency to prefer bank-centric 
approaches to regulation,23 notwithstanding that the promotion of financial 
stability requires a broad imagination about the types of shocks and 
transmission mechanisms that can generate crises.24 To be truly effective in 
addressing threats to financial stability, the FSOC should benefit from the 
different types of expertise of all of the federal financial regulatory agencies: 
the Federal Reserve should not be dominant to the exclusion of all other 
agencies. The dominance of the Treasury Secretary within the FSOC is cause 
for concern for different reasons; as a Presidential appointee, the Treasury 
Secretary has less independence from the political process than the other 
FSOC members.25 The prominence of the Treasury Secretary thus has the 
potential to render the FSOC even more susceptible to the political economy 
of the financial regulatory cycle than it would otherwise be.26 
                                                                                                                     
 20 See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 21 See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 22 Dodd–Frank Act § 111(b)(1)(B). 
 23 See infra notes 209–12 and accompanying text. 
 24 In a letter to the Queen of England addressing her question “why had nobody 
noticed that the credit crunch was on its way?”, the British Academy for the Humanities 
and Social Sciences responded: 
[T]he failure to foresee the timing, extent and severity of the crisis and to head it off, 
while it had many causes, was principally a failure of the collective imagination of 
many bright people, both in this country and internationally, to understand the risks to 
the system as a whole. 
Letter from Tim Besley, Professor, London Sch. of Econ., and Peter Hennessey, Professor, 
Queen Mary Univ. of London, to Her Majesty The Queen 3 (July 22, 2009), 
http://www.britac.ac.uk/events/archive/forum-economy.cfm [http://perma.cc/4JKZ-9YGA]. 
 25 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 26 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
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This Article suggests a number of reforms intended to address the 
concerns raised about the FSOC’s structure and mandate. One far-reaching, 
and potentially very effective, reform would be to consolidate prudential 
supervision of all United States financial institutions into a single well-
resourced prudential regulatory agency, and then abolish the FSOC. 
Australia’s successful experience with its Australian Prudential Regulatory 
Authority could serve as a template for designing such an agency.27 
Recognizing, however, the intransigence of the United States’ federal financial 
regulatory architecture, this Article also explores a number of reforms 
intended to work largely within the existing regulatory structure. These range 
from requiring financial stability-related testimony and certifications from the 
heads of each federal financial regulatory agency, to amending Dodd–Frank to 
include a definition of “financial stability,” to implementing a statutory 
financial stability mandate for all of the federal financial agencies. Such a 
mandate would be designed to mitigate the political economy of the financial 
regulatory cycle by training regulatory attention on financial stability issues 
even in normal and boom times, when the public is largely oblivious to such 
issues. The mandate would also assist in fostering a regulatory identity that is 
more impervious to capture, and permit regulators to develop broader, simpler, 
rules that are better calculated to promote stability than rules that deal too 
granularly with the minutiae of financial activities.28 
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses why 
financial stability regulation is so important, and makes the case for proactive 
financial stability regulation, rather than simply letting instability develop and 
then cleaning up after the fact. In particular, Part II tackles the normative 
question of how we should balance the need for financial stability with the 
desire for an efficient financial system. Part III provides an introduction to the 
FSOC that provides context for the remainder of the Article. Part IV discusses 
some of the operational difficulties the FSOC faces in pursuing its financial 
stability mandate, highlighting the problems of member agency coordination 
as well as the problematic dominance of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. 
It then moves on to consider the inconsistencies, ambiguities, and general lack 
of clarity inherent in the mandate itself, particularly when it comes to the 
threshold issue of what exactly we mean by “financial stability.” Part V 
responds to the concerns raised in Part IV by suggesting some reform options, 
the most meaningful and radical of which involves the creation of a stand-
alone prudential regulator with resources that befit the gravity of the task of 
regulating for financial stability. Part VI concludes. 
                                                                                                                     
 27 See infra notes 320–25 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra Part V.B. 
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY REGULATION 
A. The Social Costs of Financial Instability 
When the financial system breaks down, there is usually a negative impact 
on the price of financial assets: highly-leveraged financial institutions will 
likely need to sell their assets quickly, which can depress asset prices system-
wide,29 and this can precipitate a lack of confidence that leads other investors 
to seek an “early-mover advantage” by selling off their financial assets before 
other investors do (in popular parlance, a “run”).30 The financial system is the 
primary provider of credit to the broader economy, and in this type of 
environment, financial institutions tend to restrict lending.31 From a 
macroeconomic perspective, this is how the real harm occurs. When 
businesses and local governments are no longer able to obtain credit through 
the incapacitated financial system, it limits their ability to expand and prevents 
broader economic growth.32 This Article argues that the most pernicious 
aspect of the Financial Crisis was not the harm that it inflicted on financial 
assets and institutions, but the longer term slowdown of macroeconomic 
growth that ensued.33 
The negative macroeconomic effects of the Financial Crisis have proved 
more enduring than the hit to financial asset prices. Stock prices returned to 
                                                                                                                     
 29 Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–
2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 77, 94 (2009). 
 30 Id. at 96. 
 31 Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 173, 183 (2013). 
 32 Brunnermeier, supra note 29, at 90. 
 33 In many respects, this concern is similar to the concerns expressed by Piketty in his 
book Capital in the Twenty-First Century. To grossly oversimplify, Piketty’s thesis is that 
the rate of return on capital (“r”—where capital is comprised of financial and non-financial 
assets) is likely to exceed the rate of economic growth (“g”) in the twenty-first century. 
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 25–26 (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., 2014). Those without significant amounts of accumulated capital derive income 
primarily from wages that remain stagnant or even shrink as economic growth slows, and 
thus wealth is concentrated in the hands of a very small group that has already amassed 
significant amounts of capital that is appreciating at a rate of return in excess of what most 
people can earn as wages. See id. Piketty’s chief recommendation to address this dynamic 
of widening inequality is the implementation of progressive taxes on capital. Id. at 471. 
This Article does not purport to comment on the merits of such proposal, nor does it 
engage with Piketty’s thesis about declining growth rates more generally. Instead, it notes 
that one of the key problems identified by Piketty—that inequality becomes further 
entrenched when r>g—is worsened by financial crises that exacerbate the disparity 
between r and g by suppressing broad-based economic growth. Id. So long as r>g, “past 
wealth naturally takes on disproportionate importance, because it takes only a small flow of 
new savings to increase the stock of wealth steadily and substantially.” Id. at 25. 
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their pre-Crisis heights by March of 2012,34 but the picture with regard to 
employment remained far less sanguine for far longer—and the majority of the 
population is much more dependent on wages for their livelihood than on 
financial assets.35 The unemployment rate in the United States peaked at 10% 
in October of 2009 (with underemployment at that time estimated at 17.4%),36 
and although unemployment has been steadily declining since then, when the 
stock market recovered to pre-Crisis levels in March of 2012, the 
unemployment rate was still 8.2%.37 Even as of May 2015, the unemployment 
rate was 5.5%—still much higher than the 4.6% rate that pertained in June of 
2007.38 Furthermore, unemployment has remained particularly high among 
African-Americans and Hispanics, as well as amongst young Americans39—
leading to fears of a “lost generation” that may never develop the skills and 
experience necessary to establish long-term employment.40 Even for those 
who are employed, wages (other than for superstars and CEOs)41 have 
remained largely stagnant—not just since the Financial Crisis, but since the 
bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001.42 It is not surprising, then, that the  
 
                                                                                                                     
 34 Christine Hauser, NASDAQ Finishes Above 3,000, Its Best Since Dot-Com Bubble, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/business/stocks-rally-to-
pre-2008-heights.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/PJ4A-88S3]. 
 35 According to Gallup’s annual Economics and Personal Finance survey, in April of 
2013 only 52% of all American adults had any investments in the stock market (down from 
a pre-Crisis high of 65%). See Lydia Saad, U.S. Stock Ownership Stays at Record Low, 
GALLUP (May 8, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162353/stock-ownership-stays-record-
low.aspx [http://perma.cc/SBG2-PST3].  
 36 See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 390 (Jan. 2011). This underemployment rate 
includes part-time workers who would prefer to be fully employed and those who are too 
discouraged to look for work, in addition to those who are unemployed and actively 
searching for work. 
 37 All statistics relating to unemployment levels are drawn from the Bureau of Labor 
and Statistics. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, BUREAU 
OF LAB. STAT., http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 [http://perma.cc/XM8T-66KB]. 
 38 Id. 
 39 David M. Schizer, Fiscal Policy in an Era of Austerity, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 453, 456 (2012). 
 40 Robert J. Samuelson, Is the Economy Creating a Lost Generation?, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 9, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/robert-samuelson-is-the-economy-
creating-a-lost-generation/2012/12/09/41683956-4093-11e2-bca3-aadc9b7e29c5_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/2EXY-2WDC]. 
 41 Krugman notes that wage income for the very top earners in America has surged. 
Paul Krugman, Why We’re in a New Gilded Age, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 8, 2014), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/may/08/thomas-piketty-new-gilded-age/ 
[http://perma.cc/F82N-KE3N]. 
 42 LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 5–6 (12th ed. 2012). 
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Pew Research Center has found that: 
[U]pper-income families have begun to regain some of the wealth they lost 
during the Great Recession, while middle-income families haven’t seen any 
gains. The median wealth among upper-income families increased from 
$595,300 in 2010 to $639,400 in 2013 (all dollar amounts in 2013 dollars). 
The typical wealth of middle-income families was basically unchanged in 
2013—it remained at about $96,500 over the same period.43 
It is important to note that not all of the consequences of the Financial 
Crisis can be measured in percentages or dollar terms. Federal Reserve Chair 
Janet Yellen has stressed that, when discussing unemployment, “[t]hese are 
not just statistics. . . . The toll is simply terrible on the mental and physical 
health of workers, on their marriages, on their children.”44 Ronald A. Wilson, 
the presiding judge of the municipal court of South Tucson, Arizona in 2009, 
wrote a particularly poignant account of the impact of the Financial Crisis on 
society’s most vulnerable: 
[M]y position as presiding judge . . . provides me with ample opportunity to 
observe the effects of the current economic crisis on indigent defendants who 
appear before me. These people include single parents living with their small 
children in cars, under bridges, in alleys, and in the desert; unemployed 
people who have lost their homes; and homeless veterans suffering from 
mental illness and co-occurring substance abuse problems. The worsening 
economic conditions have significantly impacted this population. I have seen 
an increase in petty misdemeanors and quality-of-life crimes. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
. . . My shoplifters steal food, toilet paper, deodorant, diapers, aspirin, 
bug spray, bandages, batteries, flashlights, blankets, soap, and beer. . . . 
 
. . . Loitering, panhandling, criminal trespass, and failure to obey lawful 
order citations have also increased. . . . 
 
. . . . 
                                                                                                                     
 43 In its analysis, the Pew Research Center refers to wealth as “the difference between 
the value of a family’s assets (such as financial assets as well as home, car and businesses) 
and debts.” Richard Fry & Rakesh Kochhar, America’s Wealth Gap Between Middle-
Income and Upper-Income Families Is Widest on Record, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 17, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/17/wealth-gap-upper-middle-income/ [http:// 
perma.cc/C7C2-NWC3]. 
 44 Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at 
“A Trans-Atlantic Agenda for Shared Prosperity”: A Conference Sponsored by the AFL-
CIO, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the IMK Macroeconomic Policy Institute, A Painfully 
Slow Recovery for America’s Workers: Causes, Implications, and the Federal Reserve’s 
Response 10 (Feb. 11, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/news 
events/speech/yellen20130211a.pdf [http://perma.cc/68BV-527M]) (footnote omitted). 
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Crimes related to substance abuse are also on the rise. As people lose 
their jobs, their homes, and their livelihood, they often slip into depression. 
Without health care, they often self-medicate with alcohol or other drugs in 
order to cope with their feelings of failure, abandonment, loss, anger, 
confusion, and betrayal. Too often the drugs and alcohol lead to driving under 
the influence, domestic violence, possession of narcotic paraphernalia, 
drinking in public, or disorderly conduct. 
 
In addition to quality-of-life crimes, there are also several criminal traffic 
and civil traffic offenses that are on the rise. Within a few weeks of 
unemployment, many people fail to renew their car insurance or 
registration. . . . What they fail to realize is that driving without a valid 
registration or car insurance may result in significant fines and the suspension 
of their driver’s license. . . . If they are caught driving on a suspended license, 
the vehicle that they are driving will be impounded and the driver will be 
taken to jail. Often this is the only vehicle in the household. . . . 
 
When a person lives in an area that has poor public transportation, . . . no 
license and no car means no job. In addition, people in these areas will now 
find it very difficult to get their children to day care, doctor’s appointments, 
or school.45 
Research has also found deleterious consequences of the Financial Crisis 
in matters as diverse as pro se litigation46 and reproduction rates,47 and the 
                                                                                                                     
 45 Ronald A. Wilson, The View from South Tucson: How the Economic Crisis Affects 
Defendants in My Courtroom, 48 JUDGES’ J. 14, 14, 34 (2009). 
 46 Richard W. Painter, Pro Se Litigation in Times of Financial Hardship—A Legal 
Crisis and Its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 45 (2011). 
 47 Ross Douthat has noted: 
American fertility plunged with the stock market in 2008, and it hasn’t recovered. Last 
week, the Pew Research Center reported that U.S. birthrates hit the lowest rate ever 
recorded in 2011, with just 63 births per 1,000 women of childbearing age. (The rate 
was 71 per 1,000 in 1990.) . . . 
 
. . . American fertility plummeted during the Great Depression, and more recent 
downturns have produced modest dips as well. 
Ross Douthat, More Babies Please, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/12/02/opinion/sunday/douthat-the-birthrate-and-americas-future.html?_r=0 [http:// 
perma.cc/7LZ2-GSJ3]. 
A study from the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research found that a 
period of stable to rising fertility rates across Europe came to a halt, and in some 
countries reversed, after 2008.  
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medical literature highlights some of the dangers that financial instability can 
pose for health. For example, a Duke study considered the “potential relation 
between U.S. stock market volatility and cardiovascular events” by looking at 
whether there was a significant increase in the occurrence of heart attacks 
during and immediately after the Financial Crisis.48 Particularly when looking 
at the period from October 2008 to April 2009, the study found a statistically 
significant increase in the number of acute myocardial infarctions.49 Also 
disturbing is a study that appeared in The Lancet regarding the suicide rate in 
the United States following the Financial Crisis, which found that there were 
an additional 1,580 suicide deaths per year in the years 2008–2010, when 
compared to the suicide mortality rate in the years 1999–2007.50 With regard 
to health more generally, one study concluded that because of financial 
constraints, people suffering from medical problems were less likely to seek 
medical assistance in the wake of the Financial Crisis.51 
This Part’s survey of social costs is by necessity abbreviated, but even this 
brief discussion makes clear that while the United States’ economy may now 
be rebounding, some of the damage inflicted by the Financial Crisis cannot be 
undone. Furthermore, to the extent that recovery is possible, it has not been 
consistent—the bulk of the ongoing social costs of the Financial Crisis are 
being borne by the more economically vulnerable members of society.52 Even 
a limited survey of the outcomes of the Financial Crisis thus makes a very 
strong case for treating financial stability not just as “nice to have,” but 
something that should be proactively pursued by financial regulators. 
                                                                                                                     
The reversal was particularly acute in Spain, Hungary, Ireland, Croatia, and 
Latvia, the study found. With the exception of Ireland, low fertility in each threatened 
the ability of future governments to support growing numbers of the elderly, who rely 
on the next generation of taxpayers to provide their pensions. 
Norma Cohen, Financial Hardship Drives Europe’s Fertility Rate Down, FIN. TIMES  
(July 11, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1b0fc39e-e982-11e2-bf03-00144feabdc0.html# 
axzz3jHUfbnXN [http://perma.cc/6B3T-HGEH]. 
 48 Mona Fiuzat et al., United States Stock Market Performance and Acute Myocardial 
Infarction Rates in 2008–2009 (from the Duke Databank for Cardiovascular Disease), 106 
AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 1545, 1547 (2010). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Aaron Reeves et al., Increase in State Suicide Rates in the USA During Economic 
Recession, 380 LANCET 1813, 1813 (2012). 
 51 Annamaria Lusardi et al., The Economic Crisis and Medical Care Use: 
Comparative Evidence from Five High-Income Countries, 96 SOC. SCI. Q. 202, 203 (2015). 
 52 Fry & Kochhar, supra note 43; see also ALDO CALIARI, CTR. OF CONCERN, 
INEQUALITY AND FINANCIAL REGULATION: PART AND PARCEL OF A POST-2015 
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA? (Oct. 2012), https://www.worldwewant2015.org/file/284057/ 
download/307928 [https://perma.cc/6P7G-EJQK]. 
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B. Financial Stability Regulation 
In previous work, I have lamented the lack of attention paid to what is 
meant by the term “financial stability”: without a clearly defined goal, 
financial stability regulation lacks legitimacy, and is likely to be implemented 
inconsistently.53 In order to clarify the meaning of the term, I have argued that 
“financial stability” should be defined to reflect both technical notions about 
the state of the financial system during periods of stability, and a value-based 
assessment about the importance of the financial system as a means to broader 
economic prosperity.54 With regard to the former, the definition of financial 
stability should emphasize that the mere absence of crisis does not denote 
stability. A stable financial system is also able to “absorb (rather than amplify) 
shocks”—no matter where they may arise (meaning that the focus of financial 
stability regulation should be broader than just “too big to fail” financial 
institutions).55 With regard to the social policy dimensions of financial 
stability, if financial institutions and markets could fail without harming the 
broader economy, then financial stability would not be such an important 
public policy goal. Unfortunately, the externalities of such failures 
(particularly the freezing up of credit) cause indirect harm to broad swathes of 
the economy, and so financial stability should be defined as a public good, 
something that must be nurtured even in good times when the financial system 
does not appear to need any government intervention.56 
The aim of financial stability regulation should be to prevent the 
externalization of the consequences of risks taken within the financial system 
to people who are outside of the financial system (and who have not agreed to 
bear such risks).57 Historically, financial stability regulation has not had such a 
                                                                                                                     
 53 Hilary J. Allen, What Is “Financial Stability”? The Need for Some Common 
Language in International Financial Regulation, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 929, 935 (2014). For a 
working definition of “financial stability,” see infra Part V.B. 
 54 In a similar vein, Rahman argues that financial reform should be informed by both 
moral and technical reasoning: 
The problem of financial reform is not merely one of technical policy design; it is also 
a thickly moral problem that involves weighty judgments about what a good economy 
looks like, what kinds of financial transactions are socially valuable, and about how 
we ought to distinguish, balance, and regulate these different kinds of activities. 
K. Sabeel Rahman, Managerialism, Structuralism, and Moral Judgment: Law, Reform 
Discourse, and the Pathologies of Financial Reform in Historical Perspective 4 (Nov. 2013) 
(prepared for presentation at the Joint Program of the Financial Institutions and European 
Law Sections, AALS Annual Meeting, New York City, January 3, 2014, for the panel 
“Taking Stock of Post-Crisis Reforms: Local, Global, and Comparative Perspectives on 
Financial Sector Regulation”), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2368292 [http://perma.cc/8PHM-
WXJT]. 
 55 Allen, supra note 53, at 943–44. 
 56 Id. at 946–47. 
 57 Allen, supra note 31, at 182. 
2015] FINANCIAL STABILITY 1099 
sweeping purview. Prior to the Financial Crisis, financial stability regulation 
was decidedly microprudential in orientation in the sense that regulatory 
attention was trained on individual financial institutions (primarily banks), 
rather than on the system as a whole.58 It was assumed that so long as 
individual banks had sufficient buffers of loss-absorbing capital and were 
prudently managed (in the regulatory lingo, were “safe and sound”), then the 
financial system as a whole would be safe.59 However, the Financial Crisis 
shattered that assumption: in 2008, financial institutions (including non-banks) 
started to sell off assets in fire sales in an attempt to protect their own safety 
and soundness, but such fire sales depressed asset values and damaged 
confidence system-wide, harming the ability of other institutions and markets 
to function.60 The Financial Crisis thus illustrated that an institution’s attempts 
to preserve its safety and soundness may come at the expense of the stability 
of the financial system as a whole, and post-Crisis, regulators have come to 
embrace the need to look beyond individual financial institutions and take a 
more “macroprudential” approach to financial regulation.61 
A macroprudential approach dictates that financial stability regulation 
should not restrict its focus to the safety and soundness of the system’s key 
component parts: financial regulators must also pay close attention to the 
interactions and linkages between the financial institutions and markets that 
constitute the financial system.62 Since the Financial Crisis, proposals have 
been made for new types of financial stability regulation that reflect this 
systemic perspective, including a pre-approval process for new financial 
products,63 limitations on the size of financial institutions,64 and transaction 
taxes.65 At present, however, there is little political will to pursue such 
measures. Instead, Dodd–Frank tends to mandate the use of more traditional 
regulatory tools to promote financial stability, like activities restrictions (such 
as the Volcker Rule),66 leverage and capital requirements,67 and clearing and 
                                                                                                                     
 58 Samuel G. Hanson et al., A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 
J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2011). 
 59 Id. at 4–5. 
 60 See id. at 5. 
 61 Bernanke, supra note 5, at 12. 
 62 Hanson et al., supra note 58, at 3. 
 63 Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial 
Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 66 (2012); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for 
Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century 
Financial Markets, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1309–10 (2013). 
 64 SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND 
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 214–17 (2010). 
 65 For a discussion of Pigouvian taxes in the financial sector, see Douglas A. 
Shackelford et al., Taxation and the Financial Sector, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 781 (2010). 
 66 Dodd–Frank Act § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012). 
 67 Id. § 171. 
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disclosure requirements.68 However, these traditional tools are being 
approached for the first time from a macroprudential, as well as 
microprudential, perspective. For example, leverage and capital requirements 
are by no means new tools, but now regulators are considering deploying them 
in a countercyclical way (i.e., using them to tamp down an incipient boom, and 
to loosen restrictions in a slump).69 Constant monitoring of the entire financial 
system, and the risks building up within it, is an essential precondition to 
knowing when and how to deploy these traditional regulatory tools to 
macroprudential ends—and indeed a precondition to financial stability 
regulation more generally.70 
While financial stability regulation is an important undertaking, it is also a 
difficult one, facing numerous challenges. The global nature of financial 
institutions and markets dictates that financial stability regulation must be an 
international endeavor, yet global agreement on financial stability regulation 
can be hard to come by.71 At both the international and the domestic level, 
financial institutions tend to arbitrage financial stability regulation in a way 
that can thwart its efficacy.72 In addition, the complexity of the interconnected 
actors and products that constitute the financial system can complicate 
                                                                                                                     
 68 See, for example, id. tit. 7, as it applies to clearing and disclosure requirements for 
swaps. 
 69 For example “the regulator can lower leverage and/or credit-extension ceilings, 
and/or boost reserve and/or capital buffer requirements, and/or raise liquidity minima 
and/or lower maturity mismatch maxima during boom phases, while doing the contrary 
during slump phases.” Robert Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional 
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a growing money supply); 
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 a surge of external capital flowing into a country (measured by trade or current 
account balances); and 
 an influx of inexperienced investors into a market. 
ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 47 (Nicholas Mercuro & 
Michael D. Kaplowitz eds., 2014) (footnotes omitted). 
 70 Robert C. Hockett, Implementing Macroprudential Finance-Oversight Policy: Legal 
Considerations 14 (Oct. 14, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2340316 [http://perma.cc/ZB4U-B53X]. 
 71 Allen, supra note 53, at 929–31. 
 72 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address 
the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 100–01 (2013). 
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financial stability regulation,73 and political economy concerns can undermine 
financial stability regulation.74 These last two concerns are particularly salient 
when considering how best to design financial regulatory architecture (the 
focus of Parts IV and V of this Article), and so they are worthy of some further 
elaboration here. 
First, the complexity of the constantly evolving financial system ensures 
that threats to financial stability do not always come from expected sources.75 
As such, regulators can never be overconfident about which parts of the 
system may generate financial instability.76 Caution against such 
overconfidence is an important lesson from the Financial Crisis: before the 
Financial Crisis, many believed that commercial banks were the only 
institutions subject to maturity mismatch (meaning they used short-term 
funding to acquire longer term assets), and therefore that commercial banks 
were the only institutions that were vulnerable to the runs and panics that 
could precipitate financial crises.77 However, runs in the money market mutual 
fund and repo markets during the Financial Crisis illustrated that susceptibility 
to runs was not unique to commercial banks.78 Furthermore, events like the 
“Flash Crash” that have occurred since the Financial Crisis suggest that future 
instability might be generated by financial institution activities that have 
nothing to do with maturity mismatch.79 As such, financial stability regulators 
must keep an open mind and an expansive view of the interconnections within 
the financial system.80 
Turning to the political economy of financial stability regulation, recent 
experience suggests that once a financial crisis develops, there will be 
                                                                                                                     
 73 Allen, supra note 31, at 189–90. 
 74 For a fulsome discussion of the political economy of Dodd–Frank, see generally 
Coffee, supra note 12. 
 75 Financial stability regulation is particularly concerned with “what happens in 
lower-probability, higher-impact crisis circumstances (known as ‘fat-tail’ events), when 
rational assumptions about the operation of [the financial system] are less likely to hold.” 
Allen, supra note 31, at 193 (footnote omitted). 
 76 See Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in 
Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1574 (2014) (regarding the dangers of dismissing 
“alternative potential sources of systemic risk because of the perceived lack of historical 
precedents”). 
 77 RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 57 (5th ed. 
2013). 
 78 Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, 2010 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 261, 267 (2010). 
 79 See infra text accompanying notes 226–28. 
 80 “[O]wing to the changing nature of the financial system, banks could no longer be 
considered the unique source of systemic risk.” Michael W. Taylor, The Road From “Twin 
Peaks”—and the Way Back, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 61, 85 (2009). Instead, regulators should be 
looking for structural interconnections and vulnerabilities throughout the financial system. 
Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 76, at 1575. 
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sufficient political will to address it.81 However, when the financial system 
appears to be performing well, the public and politicians tend to have little 
appetite for financial stability regulation82 (to the extent that the public is 
paying any attention at all to financial stability regulation during normal times, 
such regulation is liable to be interpreted as an encroachment on private 
freedoms).83 The financial industry will be paying keen attention to financial 
stability regulation at all times, however, and has consistently strong (and 
reasonably uniform) incentives to lobby financial regulatory agencies to 
diminish financial stability regulations that impose short-term costs on the 
industry.84 Such lobbying efforts can be difficult for regulators to resist in the 
absence of public support. 
The influence of the financial industry in times of societal apathy can also 
be exerted in ways that are much less overt than lobbying. Cognitive capture is 
a phenomenon that has been much discussed in the financial regulatory 
sphere.85 This type of capture doesn’t necessarily evince any venal corruption 
of regulatory agencies—instead, merely by identifying with the financial 
industry (perhaps because they share social networks, or because they admire 
the industry’s expertise), financial regulators sometimes take on the worldview 
of that industry.86 The risk of regulators doing so becomes particularly acute at 
times when the public has no interest in financial regulatory matters.87 
Cognitive capture can also arise when the regulator is dependent on the 
financial industry for its information: that information is often filtered through 
the industry’s perspective before the regulator even receives it.88 When 
cognitive capture is at work, financial regulators tend to view the “public 
interest” as being synonymous with the efficiency and short-term profitability 
of the financial industry they regulate.89 However, this type of regulatory 
                                                                                                                     
 81 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 72, at 96. See generally Andrew Crockett, Why 
Is Financial Stability a Goal of Public Policy?, in MAINTAINING FINANCIAL STABILITY IN A 
GLOBAL ECONOMY: A SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF 
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(2011). 
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 83 Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 671 
(2012). 
 84 Coffee, supra note 12, at 1027. 
 85 See, e.g., James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING 
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Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2013). 
 86 Id. at 77. 
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approach is anathema to financial stability regulation, which requires a long-
term perspective that prioritizes the interests of those outside of the financial 
industry. 
The political economy cycle thus creates enormous challenges for any 
regulatory body charged with promoting financial stability, particularly 
because it is almost impossible to demonstrate when financial stability 
regulation is making a difference within such a complex system—“[h]ow can 
a regulatory agency show that a financial crisis would have occurred but for its 
efforts?”90 Furthermore, given the complexity and unpredictability of the 
financial system, regulatory errors are inevitable91—but financial stability 
regulation can also succeed (particularly when it is designed to reduce the 
complexity of the financial system).92 If government agencies abdicate their 
power over the financial system, such power will not dissipate but will accrue 
to private actors.93 As Pistor phrased it, lack of governmental regulation of 
financial markets “signifies not the absence of regulation, but the implicit 
delegation of rule making to different, typically non-state actors,”94 and the 
non-state actors that tend to fill the power vacuum in the financial sphere tend 
to be financial institutions with neither the ability, nor the inclination, to 
address the endogenous risks that destabilize the financial system and cause 
externalities for the world beyond the financial sector.95 Financial regulators, 
and financial stability regulation, are thus critical to protecting society’s long-
term interest in financial stability. 
C. The Inadequacies of a Purely Ex Post-Focused Approach to 
Financial Stability Regulation 
It can be tempting for regulators to eschew unpopular financial stability 
regulation when the economy is booming, knowing that if and when a crisis 
occurs, there is likely to be overwhelming political support for remedial 
                                                                                                                     
 90 Allen, supra note 31, at 190. 
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 92 See infra text accompanying notes 124–30. 
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identifying how the actions of individual firms may make the financial system less stable.” 
Eric J. Pan, Understanding Financial Regulation, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1897, 1941 (2012). 
1104 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:5 
measures.96 However, these ex post emergency measures can be limited in 
their efficacy, as well as generate their own social costs. A purely ex post 
approach to financial stability regulation is thus undesirable.97 To illustrate 
this point, this Part will briefly explore and analyze the different types of ex 
post measures available. To be clear, despite evincing a preference for 
proactive measures to promote financial stability, this Article is not rejecting 
ex post measures outright. Proactive regulations will never do a perfect job of 
maintaining financial stability, and some form of the ex post mitigative 
interventions discussed below may still be necessary98 (although care is 
required to ensure that, in accepting the potential need for ex post measures, 
we do not institutionalize fatalism about financial crises, or discourage the 
refinement of ex ante measures). The aim of proactive financial stability 
regulation is to minimize the need for the following types of ex post 
interventions. 
Central banks (like the Federal Reserve) are often the “first responders” to 
financial crises—they tend to be very accommodating in their monetary policy 
during and in the aftermath of a crisis, lowering interest rates to encourage 
borrowing and spending.99 Central banks can also attempt to lubricate the 
financial system in ways that cannot be strictly characterized as monetary 
policy, but lie in a hazy area somewhere in-between monetary policy, market 
participation, and regulation.100 These functions include acting as lender of 
last resort (i.e., lending to banks when no other source of liquidity is 
available)101 or, as we saw during the last Financial Crisis, acting as market-
maker of last resort (i.e., buying assets to create liquidity when there is no 
other buyer).102 Unfortunately, these policies (even if necessary) have social 
costs: extended periods of low interest rates in the wake of the Financial Crisis 
have made it difficult for senior citizens and others to live off their savings, 
which has increased demand for riskier assets with higher yields, making the 
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populace more susceptible to financial fraud103 and increasingly questionable 
securities investments.104 Financial institutions are also searching for higher 
yields in this prolonged low-interest rate environment, and have started 
making funds available to corporations on riskier terms,105 potentially sowing 
the seeds for future instability.106 Future instability may also result from 
expectations that the Federal Reserve will intervene as a lender of last resort 
(or market-maker of last resort), just as it has in the past: such expectations 
encourage financial institutions to take outsized risks that they would never 
have taken without the implicit promise of support in the event of failure.107 In 
addition to these side-effects of ex post central bank intervention, there are 
also questions about its efficacy. The ability of monetary policy to stimulate 
growth is the subject of hot debate at present,108 with many arguing that there 
is only so much that central banks can achieve in the wake of a serious 
crisis.109 
Instability tends to generate political pressure for elected governments to 
intervene as well. Assuming that a government reacts to this pressure (and it  
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may not,110 with governmental inaction exacerbating the crisis at hand),111 
governmental crisis management can take the form of bailing out systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs)112 (with attendant moral hazard), as 
well as the deployment of emergency fiscal policy options. While there are 
many different ways in which a government can decide to tax and spend post-
crisis, broadly speaking, there are two types of fiscal policy options available. 
First, the government can attempt to stimulate demand by tax cuts, spending, 
or both (the Keynesian option).113 Alternatively, it can try to encourage private 
spending by cutting back on government spending: referred to as the austerity 
option, the expectation here is that fiscal discipline by the government will 
inspire confidence about the state’s long-term viability and encourage private 
investment.114 Either option entails social costs: while stimulus is intended to 
create demand and jumpstart the economy in the short-term (and thus 
ameliorate the immediate pain occasioned by financial crises), the stimulus 
will increase the public deficit.115 Over time, increasing public debt can 
undermine a government’s ability to borrow, potentially compromising the 
government’s ability to fund future activities.116 In contrast, austerity 
programs impose social costs in the short-term by cutting back on government 
spending immediately.117 Although this Article will not weigh into the very 
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 115 Schizer, supra note 39, at 467. 
 116 Id. at 467–68. 
 117 See, e.g., Liz Alderman, In Ireland, Austerity Is Praised but Painful, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/business/global/despite-praise-for-its-
austerity-ireland-and-its-people-are-being-battered.html [http://perma.cc/4MAE-KVFT]; 
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active debate about austerity versus stimulus,118 these two types of policies are 
mentioned here to illustrate that ex post fiscal remedies (whether Keynesian or 
austere) always impose costs on society. 
Traditionally, financial regulatory agencies have tended to play less of a 
role than central banks and governments in immediate crisis response. While 
regulation will often be retooled to reflect the lessons of a crisis, this usually 
takes time and does little to ease the constraints on the availability of credit 
that characterize the immediate aftermath of financial crises.119 However, if 
countercyclical regulation is broadly implemented, agencies like the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) will be expected to play a much more active role in crisis 
management by making the rules that govern financial institutions much more 
permissive in bust times.120 Whilst countercyclical regulation does hold 
promise in terms of enabling regulators to ease restrictions on credit 
availability in the wake of a crisis, it also entails making regulation more 
demanding in boom times;121 countercyclical regulation does not work as a 
purely ex post response. As such, regulators will also need to focus on 
financial stability issues even when the economy seems to be functioning well. 
D. Complexity and Efficiency: Potential Problems with a Proactive 
Approach to Financial Instability 
Of course, a proactive approach to financial stability regulation is not 
costless. One concern is that the regulations themselves are new “inputs” into 
the financial system, and that the more inputs we add, the more complex—and 
less stable—the financial system will be.122 Furthermore, new regulation often 
inspires the creation of new products and institutions developed to arbitrage 
those regulatory requirements, further compounding the complexity of the 
financial system.123 However, this is not an inevitable result: if designed well, 
                                                                                                                     
Liz Alderman, More Children in Greece Are Going Hungry, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/world/europe/more-children-in-greece-start-to-go-
hungry.html [http://perma.cc/X3SK-PQR3]; Suzanne Daley, Fiscal Crisis Takes Toll on 
Health of Greeks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/27/ 
world/europe/greeks-reeling-from-health-care-cutbacks.html [https://perma.cc/3T47-UEPS]; 
Raphael Minder, Education Cuts Met with Strike in Spain, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/23/world/europe/education-and-health-care-cuts-met-with-
strike-in-spain.html [http://perma.cc/R9XZ-VU5Q]. 
 118 See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, A Keynesian Victory, but Austerity Stands Firm, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/22/business/despite-keynesians-
victory-economic-policy-holds.html [https://perma.cc/VB3K-QDTN]. 
 119 See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 72, at 211–12. 
 120 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 121 Hockett, supra note 69, at 227. 
 122 For a discussion of the destabilizing effects of complexity, see generally Hilary J. 
Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business As Usual, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 861 (2015). 
 123 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 72, at 100–01. 
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ex ante financial stability regulation can instead mitigate the financial system’s 
spiral into complexity.124 One way to limit arbitrage and its attendant 
complexity would be for the regulatory “burden of proof” to be shifted to the 
financial industry, so that industry participants would be required to 
demonstrate why they should be allowed to create new products and engage in 
new activities, instead of the regulators being forced to play an under-
resourced game of catch-up with the industry.125 As I have argued previously, 
such an approach is well-calibrated to minimize the number of new inputs into 
the financial system.126 Other scholars have argued that complexity could be 
reduced by breaking up “too big to fail” banks.127 Unfortunately, both of the 
aforementioned approaches are likely to face (at least at present) 
insurmountable opposition from the financial industry. There are, however, 
other—potentially more politically feasible—regulatory approaches that can 
limit the increase of complexity. In particular, favoring broad and simple 
regulations over detailed and complex ones can be particularly useful in 
promoting financial stability.128 Not only are broad and simple rules more 
difficult to arbitrage, they are also more appropriate because they are “robust 
to [the] ignorance” inherent in complex and uncertain systems129—that is, they 
are not tailored in too detailed a way to reflect the lessons of past experience 
(which are often not a predictor of future crises).130 In sum, while ex ante 
financial stability regulations can result in increased complexity and attendant 
compromised stability, they can also be designed to avoid or minimize this 
eventuality. 
Others have argued against a proactive approach to financial stability 
regulation on the grounds that “pursuing ex ante regulation as the only, or even 
primary, regulatory strategy aimed at controlling systemic risk would be 
                                                                                                                     
 124 It is also naïve to suggest that complexity would not deepen in the absence of 
regulation: exceedingly complex over-the-counter derivatives developed in the largely 
unregulated space carved out by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. 
Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82 
U. COLO. L. REV. 167 (2011). 
 125 Allen, supra note 31, at 179. 
 126 Id. at 222. 
 127 See, e.g., JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 64, at 214–17. 
 128 By way of example, Haldane and Madouros have suggested the following ways in 
which capital adequacy requirements might be simplified: removing internal risk-based 
models from the Basel capital adequacy architecture; increasing (and relying more heavily) 
on a simple leverage ratio; and allowing more scope for regulatory discretion. Andrew G. 
Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability & Vasileios Madouros, Economist, Bank of Eng., 
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 36th Economic Policy Symposium: 
The Changing Policy Landscape, The Dog and the Frisbee 14–17 (Aug. 31, 2012) 
(transcript available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2012/ah.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/AA5A-8KBH]). 
 129 Id. at 3. 
 130 Id. at 4. 
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inefficient.”131 However, directing regulators to prioritize efficiency lends 
credence to those who seek less-regulated capital flows, even at the expense of 
financial stability. This Article argues, to the contrary, that regulators need a 
clear direction that the primary normative goal of financial regulatory policy is 
the ex ante pursuit of financial stability. Whilst efficiency is a relevant 
concern, it is of lesser importance than financial stability.132 
Any analysis of the relative importance of financial stability and efficiency 
as goals for financial regulation raises the threshold issue of what is meant by 
“efficiency.”133 Efficiency, as a normative goal of regulation, is usually 
interpreted to mean optimal allocative efficiency,134 in the Kaldor–Hicksian 
sense that “the aggregate economic benefits exceed the aggregate economic 
costs, even though some market participants may bear costs on net while 
others reap benefits on net.”135 On its face, allocative efficiency may seem like 
an appropriate end goal for regulation of the financial system (after all, the 
system exists largely for the purpose of allocating capital resources and 
risk).136 However, a Kaldor–Hicksian analysis of the financial system fails to 
consider distributional inequalities within that system137: many of the capital 
resources distributed are recycled amongst financial institutions in what 
Lothian has termed “financial hypertrophy,” whereas lesser amounts of capital 
                                                                                                                     
 131 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 72, at 102. 
 132 “Things happen during a speculative bubble that can ruin people’s lives. Little will 
be done to stop these things if public figures consider themselves beholden to some 
overarching efficient markets principle.” ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 
212 (2d ed. 2005). In a similar vein, Driesen has argued that the avoidance of systemic risk 
(while still allowing for economic growth) is “both more meaningful and more achievable 
than the goal of economic efficiency.” David M. Driesen, Legal Theory Lessons from the 
Financial Crisis, 40 J. CORP. L. 55, 91 (2014). 
 133 “A major problem with the debates on efficiency in markets and capital market 
policy has been the lack of a clear efficiency rationale.” Gill North & Ross P. Buckley, A 
Fundamental Re-Examination of Efficiency in Capital Markets in Light of the Global 
Financial Crisis, 33 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 714, 741 (2010). 
 134 DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW 20 (2012); Anabtawi & 
Schwarcz, supra note 72, at 90; Stiglitz, supra note 97, at 14. 
 135 Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency Criterion for Securities Regulation: Investor 
Welfare or Total Surplus?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 87 (2015). 
 136 Financial market theory in the decades preceding the Financial Crisis was premised 
on the assumption that allocative efficiency enabled “providers and users of funds more 
effectively to meet their preferences for risk, return and liquidity.” FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE 
TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 40 (Mar. 
2009) [hereinafter THE TURNER REVIEW], http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_ 
review.pdf [http://perma.cc/BY3G-8LWK]. 
 137 Lee, supra note 135, at 87. For similar reasons, Kaplow and Shavell reject wealth 
maximization and efficiency criteria as the sole criteria for assessing rules to the extent that 
they omit “important aspects of individuals’ well-being” and ignore distributive concerns. 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 
(2001). 
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flow to more productive uses by households and non-financial businesses.138 If 
the financial system exists to promote broad-based economic growth, and not 
just capital appreciation, then the way that capital is distributed matters.139 
Furthermore, the concentration of resources within the financial system is 
problematic for financial stability because “the very size of financial markets 
thus created pushes the limits of what sovereigns are willing or able to 
provide,” in terms of backing and emergency support in times of crisis.140 
However, according to the Kaldor–Hicks model, there is no problem with this 
type of capital allocation.141 
The criterion of efficiency has also been criticized as an ineffectual 
standard for evaluating something as complex as financial stability regulation. 
Driesen, for example, argues that financial regulation does not control the 
allocation of capital, but instead creates a framework within which capital is 
allocated.142 Although the regulatory framework certainly influences capital 
allocation, there are many other variables—outside of the control of 
regulation—that also influence capital allocation. Because the influence of 
these different variables cannot be isolated, Driesen argues that optimal 
allocative efficiency is not a yardstick by which financial regulation can be 
measured.143 Furthermore, when regulation is assessed to determine whether it 
promotes efficiency, such assessment usually involves some form of 
                                                                                                                     
 138 Lothian has described “financial hypertrophy” as the “expansion of the financial 
sector (measured by the proportion of talent, as well as resources and profits that it 
absorbs) without regard to the service extended to the real economy.” Tamara Lothian, 
American Finance and American Democracy: Towards an Institutionalist “Law and 
Economics,” 7–8 (Columbia Law Sch. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 418, 
2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1996653 [http://perma.cc/5H43-8B8L]. 
 139 Lothian contrasts financial hypertrophy with financial deepening:  
By financial deepening, I mean the increase of the service that finance renders to the 
expansion of productive output and the enhancement of productivity. By financial 
hypertrophy, I mean the expansion of the size of the financial industry, as a proportion 
of national income or profits as well as a magnet for talent, without a corresponding 
reinforcement of support for the expansion of output and the enhancement of 
productivity. The concept of financial hypertrophy, as I propose to use it, is therefore 
parasitic on the concept of financial deepening. Financial hypertrophy is the expansion 
of finance without financial deepening.  
Id. 
 140 Pistor, supra note 94, at 323. 
 141 Stiglitz, supra note 97, at 14. Black notes that the use of such economic models to 
assess the financial system is not merely a passive evaluation, but also drives how the 
system functions. Julia Black, Reconceiving Financial Markets—From the Economic to the 
Social, 13 J. CORP. L. STUD. 401, 432 (2013). Using a model that is insensitive to capital 
distribution will exacerbate any tendency of the financial system to work in a similarly 
insensitive way. Id. at 435. 
 142 Driesen, supra note 132, at 56. 
 143 Id. 
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quantified cost–benefit analysis.144 Unfortunately, quantified cost–benefit 
analysis is ill-suited to assessing financial stability regulation for a number of 
reasons. First, it gives us little guidance as to the stakeholders that should be 
considered in the analysis145: when trying to assess costs and benefits, should 
we consider only the financial institutions that populate the financial system 
(and their counterparties), or should regulation also be concerned with those 
who suffer from externalities generated by those financial institutions? Even if 
it were accepted that cost–benefit analysis should consider the benefits to the 
latter type of stakeholders, it is very difficult to quantify the social benefits of 
avoiding instability,146 and to show that instability would have occurred but 
for the regulatory intervention.147 It is much easier to assign a dollar value to 
industry compliance costs, and so a paramount focus on efficiency and cost–
benefit analysis is likely to favor the absence of financial stability 
regulation,148 even when such a deregulatory approach is likely to entail large 
social costs. When dealing with the broad social costs of financial crises and 
how they are distributed, cost–benefit analysis is therefore an inapt tool.149 
Of course, “efficiency” need not be defined solely in reference to optimal 
allocative efficiency, and quantified cost–benefit analysis need not be the only 
tool used to evaluate financial regulation. If “inefficiency” were 
conceptualized as including any situation where financial institutions generate 
externalities that negatively impact the broader economy (including in ways 
that are difficult—if not impossible—to quantify), then “inefficiency” and 
“financial instability” would describe largely the same state of affairs. This 
Part could then be accused of setting up a false dichotomy between stability 
and efficiency. However, efficiency is not usually conceived of in so broad a 
fashion.150 Instead, regulation promoting efficiency tends to neglect the 
                                                                                                                     
 144 “[Q]uantified CBA in its ideal form—which some of its advocates refer to as 
‘complete’ quantified CBA—entails specification and quantification of all benefits and 
costs in a single, uniform bottom-line metric (typically, dollars) representing the net 
welfare effects of a proposed rule.” John C. Coates IV, Cost–Benefit Analysis of Financial 
Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 893 (2015) (footnote 
omitted) (citing Letter from Nancy Nord et al. to Thomas R. Carper, Chair of the Senate 
Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs Comm., and Thomas A. Coburn, Ranking Member  
of the Senate Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs Comm. 2 (June 18, 2013), 
http://www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=8eb0dbd9-5631-4878-bfb2-
e040407cf0ba [http://perma.cc/BB9B-HER8]). 
 145 Lee, supra note 135, at 117–18. 
 146 “[F]inancial products affect nearly every activity of all citizens on a daily basis,” 
which further complicates any attempt to capture the overall effect of regulation. Id. at 107. 
 147 Allen, supra note 31, at 190–91. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Lee asserts that cost–benefit analysis is inapt for assessing distributional concerns. 
Lee, supra note 135, at 102. 
 150 North & Buckley, supra note 133, at 716. Anabtawi and Schwarcz also note that 
the social costs of financial instability are sometimes conceived of as being “encompassed 
under a broad view of economic efficiency,” but then go on to say that “they are sometimes 
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externalities of financial system failure that are imposed on persons outside of 
the financial system,151 who are nonetheless affected by the movements of the 
broader economy (such as “laborers whose jobs would be lost” when 
economic growth stalls after a financial crisis).152 It also neglects the 
disproportionate externalities of an economic downturn borne by those who do 
participate in the financial system, but only in a minor, uncomplicated way 
(for example, “pension holders whose pension funds would be eviscerated by 
excessive risk taking”).153 Although many believed prior to the Financial 
Crisis that the financial system was efficiently allocating risk to those within 
the system who were most willing to bear it, in fact much of that risk was 
being externalized outside of the financial system to the broader economy,154 
with disastrous social consequences. 
As such, financial regulation should be primarily informed by a normative 
goal that is more inclusive than optimal allocative efficiency, and that 
promotes general societal well-being in a way that is somewhat sensitive to 
distributional inequalities.155 An acceptance of this normative position is often 
implicit in ex post responses to financial crises, when efficiency concerns tend 
to be abandoned in favor of interventionist policies that seek to promote social 
welfare.156 As Lothian has noted, the current state of affairs is that 
“[e]verything happens, in the realm of ideas and of public debate as if the 
market fundamentalist view were the economics of normal times and the 
Keynsian view, the economics of crises and recession.”157 However, as this 
Part has already explored, by the time a crisis erupts, it is too late to avoid 
many of the negative externalities caused by financial instability. The 
                                                                                                                     
regarded as implicating non-efficiency considerations.” Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 
72, at 90. 
 151 As Schwarcz puts it, “Even though systemic risk is a form of financial risk, it 
stands apart and should be differentiated from traditional financial risk. Traditional 
financial risk focuses on risks within the financial system, and so efficiency should be the 
central goal. Conversely, systemic risk focuses on risks to the financial system.” Stephen 
L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 207 (2008). 
 152 Stiglitz, supra note 97, at 20. 
 153 Id. 
 154 THE TURNER REVIEW, supra note 136, at 42. 
 155 Stiglitz, supra note 97, at 15. In a similar vein, Driesen notes, “This efficiency 
focus remains predominant even though scholars have cast doubt on allocative efficiency’s 
normative value.” Driesen, supra note 132, at 62. 
 156 As to the lack of cost–benefit rationale offered for bailouts in 2008, see Driesen, 
supra note 132, at 92. Similarly, when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
temporarily banned all short selling of stock in financial institutions in the wake of the 
Lehman Brothers collapse, there was no mention of cost–benefit analysis (or indeed, of 
costs at all). See Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, 73 Fed. Reg. 
55,169 (Sept. 18, 2008). 
 157 Tamara Lothian, Beyond Macro-Prudential Regulation: Three Ways of Thinking 
About Financial Crisis, Regulation and Reform 12 (Columbia Law Sch. Working Paper 
Series, Paper No. 411, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961369 [http://perma.cc/96EE-9WZ5]. 
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acceptance of financial stability as the chief normative goal of regulation needs 
to exist in good times as well as bad. 
All of this is not to say that regulation should ignore efficiency concerns 
entirely. Efficient markets allow “providers and users of funds more 
effectively to meet their preferences for risk, return and liquidity,” and in 
circumstances where the normative goals of efficiency and financial stability 
are compatible, regulation should aim to promote efficiency.158 However, the 
pursuit of efficiency (especially in the short-term) will often be detrimental to 
financial stability, and vice versa.159 In these instances, financial regulators 
will need to decide to what extent either efficiency or stability should be 
sacrificed, and while regulators should not be so precautionary that they ban 
any activity that could potentially harm financial stability, financial regulators 
need to have a clear hierarchy of priorities that instructs them to err on the side 
of protecting the smooth functioning of the financial system.160 At present, 
however, only one of the many financial regulatory agencies in the United 
States is charged with a statutory mandate to pursue financial stability as its 
paramount goal: the FSOC. The next Part provides an introduction to this new 
agency, before Part IV considers whether it is up to its vitally important task. 
III. MEET THE FSOC 
Instead of rationalizing the byzantine structure of the United States’ 
financial regulatory agencies, or giving any of these existing agencies a 
financial stability mandate,161 the Dodd–Frank legislation enacted in 2010 
created a council of the heads of various existing agencies162 named the 
“Financial Stability Oversight Council,”163 and bestowed on that council alone 
an express statutory mandate to promote financial stability.164 In the five years 
                                                                                                                     
 158 THE TURNER REVIEW, supra note 136, at 40. 
 159 For example, new financial products that seek to improve efficiency by providing 
ever more bespoke methods of allocating risk and creating liquidity can create destabilizing 
complexity. “It is for instance arguable that the allocative efficiency benefits of the creation 
of markets for many complex structured [products] (e.g., CDO-squareds) would have been 
at most trivial even if they had not played a role in creating financial instability.” Id. at 41. 
 160 Allen, supra note 31, at 204. 
 161 Who Is Too Big to Fail? GAO’s Assessment of the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council and the Office of Financial Research: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight 
& Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 65–88 (2013) (statement of 
A. Nicole Clowers, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment) [hereinafter 
Clowers Statement]. 
 162 The FSOC also has an independent member with insurance expertise, who does not 
represent any federal agency. Dodd–Frank Act § 111(b)(1)(j), 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012). 
 163 Id. § 111. 
 164 Id. § 112(a). “The Financial Stability Oversight Council has a clear statutory 
mandate that creates for the first time collective accountability for identifying risks and 
responding to emerging threats to financial stability.” Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 
About FSOC: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ 
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since it was created, surprisingly little academic attention has been paid to the 
FSOC’s mandate, or to how it will or should carry out its functions (other than 
the current furor over its designation powers).165 Furthermore, there has been 
almost no discussion of how inserting a new administrative body into the 
financial regulatory mix will impact the existing regulatory apparatus.166 This 
Part will provide an introduction to the FSOC that will allow the rest of this 
Article to engage in a more fulsome discussion of these issues. 
The FSOC is a council of the officials who lead the federal financial 
regulatory agencies. Each of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Chairperson of the FDIC, the Director of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Chairman of the SEC, the 
Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the 
Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency and the Chairman of the 
National Credit Union Administration Board is a voting member of the FSOC, 
as is “an independent member appointed by the President, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, having insurance expertise.”167 The FSOC 
also has five non-voting members: the Director of the Office of Financial 
Research, the Director of the Federal Insurance Office, and representative state 
banking, insurance and securities commissioners.168 Finally, the Treasury 
Secretary is a voting member, and also acts as the Chair of the FSOC.169 
Although the FSOC’s members (and the agencies they lead) have not been 
individually charged with express financial stability mandates, pursuant to 
section 112(b) of Dodd–Frank, each voting member is required to submit an 
annual statement to Congress outlining its views on extant threats to financial 
stability. 
The FSOC is distinguishable from the more substantial regulatory bodies 
led by its members because it has only a small dedicated staff,170 and a 
                                                                                                                     
fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/29UM-3F22] (last updated May 19, 2015) 
[hereinafter FSOC FAQs]. 
 165 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 166 This is an important question because, inevitably, “the organization of the 
administrative system affects the substance of regulation.” Keith Bradley, The Design of 
Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745, 748 (2011). 
 167 Dodd–Frank Act § 111(b)(1). 
 168 Id. § 111(b)(2). 
 169 Id. § 111(b)(1). 
 170 As of June 2012, there were twenty-five staff in the “dedicated policy office within 
the Treasury’s Office of Domestic Finance . . . which functions as the FSOC Secretariat.” 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-886, FINANCIAL STABILITY: NEW COUNCIL 
AND RESEARCH OFFICE SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY 
OF THEIR DECISIONS 12 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648064.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/B68K-N346] [hereinafter GAO-12-886]. In addition, the Independent Member of 
the FSOC with Insurance Expertise, together with his or her small staff, are FSOC staff 
members. Id. at 5, 60. 
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relatively small budget.171 Whilst Dodd–Frank did create an Office of 
Financial Research (OFR) to lend data-gathering and analytical support to the 
FSOC, the FSOC does not have substantial resources to implement policies 
reflecting the OFR’s research.172 For these reasons, some have suggested that 
the FSOC is just a communication and coordination forum, a formal (albeit 
more transparent and inclusive) continuation of the President’s Working 
Group on Financial Markets that existed pre-Dodd–Frank.173 However, Dodd–
Frank grants the FSOC a number of important powers that the President’s 
Working Group did not have. These can be divided into two categories: 
powers over private entities and powers over other agencies. With regard to 
the former, pursuant to section 113 of Dodd–Frank, the FSOC is responsible 
for determining the non-bank financial companies that pose sufficient risk to 
financial stability that should be subjected to heightened supervision and 
regulation by the Federal Reserve.174 The FSOC also has a similar power with 
respect to financial market utilities.175 These designation powers have been 
called “[b]y far the FSOC’s most important substantive function.”176 
With regard to the powers that the FSOC has over the other financial 
regulatory agencies, these include section 119, which allows the FSOC to 
resolve (with a non-binding recommendation) disputes amongst other 
agencies, and section 1023, which allows the FSOC to invalidate any 
rulemaking made by the CFPB that the FSOC deems threatening to stability. 
At the weaker end of the spectrum is the FSOC’s power pursuant to section 
112(d) to request, but not compel, information from individual agencies. 
Perhaps the most important of the FSOC’s powers over the financial agencies 
is section 120, which authorizes the FSOC to make recommendations that an 
                                                                                                                     
 171 The FSOC’s proposed budget for Financial Year 2015 was $8,690,355. Fin. 
Stability Oversight Council, FSOC Budget Information, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/governance-documents/Documents/FSOC%20Bud 
get%20Information%20for%20Fiscal%20Year%202015.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZZ5N-76M7]. 
 172 It has also been argued that section 152(a) of Dodd–Frank, which makes the OFR a 
department of the Treasury rather than an independent office, has rendered the OFR highly 
susceptible to political concerns and capture. Simon Johnson, The Disappointing Office of 
Financial Research, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/ 
01/30/the-disappointing-office-of-financial-research/?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/HY2R-SBQQ]. 
 173 Donald N. Lamson & Hilary Allen, Financial Stability Oversight Council: 
Completely New or Deja Vu?, 96 BNA’s BANKING REP. 974 (May 24, 2011). 
 174 To date, the FSOC has designated AIG, GE Capital, Prudential, and MetLife as 
Systematically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). William M. Butler, Falling on 
Deaf Ears: The FSOC’s Evidentiary Hearing Provides Little Opportunity to Challenge a 
Nonbank SIFI Designation, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 663, 664 (2014); DealBook, MetLife 
Formally Challenges “Systemically Important” Designation, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(Oct. 3, 2014, 5:08 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/metlife-formally-challenges-
designation-as-systemically-important/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/HAU7-ZYQN]. 
 175 Dodd–Frank Act § 804, 12 U.S.C § 5463 (2012). 
 176 Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 327, 369 (2013). For a detailed discussion of how the designation process 
works, see Butler, supra note 174, at 665–72. 
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agency “apply new or heightened standards and safeguards . . . for a financial 
activity or practice,” if the FSOC determines that such activity or practice is 
systemically risky. Because of these powers, some observers have concluded 
that the FSOC is a “peak-level arbiter” with “strong oversight.”177 However, 
some of the financial regulatory agencies have openly declared their resistance 
to conceding power to the “FSOC178: for example, the SEC has bluntly stated 
its view that the FSOC was not designed as a ‘super-regulator.’”179 
The legislative debates regarding Dodd–Frank make it clear that 
legislators deliberately chose not to give the FSOC a direct power to compel 
action from any agencies,180 but the recommendation procedure in section 120 
can be viewed as a stick that incentivizes individual agencies to respond to 
informal suggestions for action.181 Should an agency fail to respond to 
informal pressure, pursuant to section 120, the FSOC can publicly recommend 
that certain steps be taken with respect to a particular financial activity or 
practice (these can range between “limiting its scope, or applying particular 
capital or risk management requirements to the conduct of the activity or 
prohibiting the activity or practice”).182 If the agency in question fails to 
                                                                                                                     
 177 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1187 (2012). 
 178 It should not be surprising that an attempt to impose centralized control over 
existing financial regulatory agencies might invoke some type of resentment or resistance. 
See David P. McCaffrey et al., The Appeal and Difficulties of Participative Systems, 6 
ORG. SCI. 603, 604 (1995). 
 179 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-151, DODD–FRANK ACT 
REGULATIONS: IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND 
COORDINATION 111 (2011). In response to a report drafted by the GAO on the regulatory 
implementation of Dodd–Frank, the SEC and the OCC commented “that efforts to improve 
coordination through FSOC must be balanced with the need to ensure that the 
independence of each regulator is not affected.” Id. at 40. 
 180 During a lecture at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, Daniel K. Tarullo 
commented: 
[D]uring the debates preceding Dodd–Frank, some versions of proposals for what 
eventually became the FSOC would have empowered the FSOC to override agency 
action or inaction within its sphere of authority. Others, including many who favored 
strong reforms, opposed this power, which would have created a kind of super-agency 
with veto authority over all the regulators. Instead, the FSOC has the more limited 
authority to present an agency with recommendations for action and the right to 
receive an explanation should the agency not accept those recommendations. 
Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School Distinguished Jurist Lecture, Financial Stability 
Regulation 25 (Oct. 10, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/tarullo20121010a.htm [http://perma.cc/TE5M-SCBZ]). 
 181 Discussing interagency interactions, Freeman and Rossi note that: “We suspect that 
agency officials who wish to get things done can accomplish a great deal through such 
informal channels. It also seems likely that informal approaches supplement more formal 
coordination processes.” Freeman & Rossi, supra note 177, at 1156. 
 182 Dodd–Frank Act § 120(b)(2)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5330 (2012). 
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implement the FSOC’s recommendations, then it is required to explain in 
writing to the FSOC why it has failed to do so.183 The FSOC is then required 
to report such failure to Congress, which may result in the relevant agency 
being called before Congress to explain its position.184 If the prospect of 
testifying before Congress is insufficient to force individual agencies to 
comply with recommendations from the FSOC, Zaring has argued that the 
likely next step is for the FSOC to designate the key financial institutions that 
engage in the impugned financial activity as systemically important non-banks 
pursuant to section 113, thus removing them to the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Reserve and circumventing the authority of the primary regulatory agency.185 
So far, this discussion of the FSOC’s powers (and indeed almost all 
discussion of the FSOC to date) has conceived of the FSOC as a unified entity. 
However, this masks the interagency dynamics that are inevitable in a council 
comprised of multiple regulatory bodies. There is something artificial about 
discussing the FSOC’s powers over the financial regulatory agencies, given 
that the head of each of those member agencies is part of, and can to some 
extent direct the actions of, the FSOC. However, not all of the FSOC’s 
members are created equal in terms of their ability to drive the FSOC’s 
agenda: in particular, there are a number of statutory provisions that work to 
cement the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury within the FSOC. The 
Treasury Secretary, in addition to chairing the FSOC, is the only member that 
can, on its own, call a meeting of the FSOC (meetings are otherwise held 
quarterly, or upon the vote of the majority of the FSOC’s members).186 The 
Treasury Secretary as chair is also responsible for setting the agenda of any 
meeting of the FSOC, and for testifying before Congress on behalf of the 
FSOC.187 Furthermore, the Treasury Secretary has a de facto veto right with 
respect to designating non-bank financial companies for heightened prudential 
supervision pursuant to section 113 (and rescinding those designations).188 As 
such, by design, Dodd–Frank grants the Treasury Secretary an outsized role in 
the FSOC’s operations. 
In addition, the Federal Reserve has long been considered the most 
preeminent of the financial regulatory agencies,189 and is likely to be 
                                                                                                                     
 183 Id. § 120(c)(2). 
 184 Id. § 120(d)(2). 
 185 David Zaring, Money Market Fund Overhaul Is Early Test for Dodd–Frank, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 31, 2013, 2:10 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/31/ 
money-market-fund-overhaul-is-early-test-for-dodd-frank/ [http://perma.cc/995U-MJ24]. 
 186 Dodd–Frank Act § 111(e)(1). 
 187 Id. § 112(a)(2)(N). 
 188 EDWARD V. MURPHY & MICHAEL B. BERNIER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42083, 
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL: A FRAMEWORK TO MITIGATE SYSTEMIC RISK 7 
(2011), http://www.llsdc.org/assets/DoddFrankdocs/crs-r42083.pdf [http://perma.cc/X6JD-
FCYY]. 
 189 Improving Financial Institution Supervision: Examining and Addressing 
Regulatory Capture, Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Prot. of 
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particularly assertive with respect to financial stability issues within the FSOC 
(at least in the short term)190—even in the absence of any statutory authority to 
do so. The Federal Reserve and Treasury are also the members of the FSOC 
that are chiefly responsible for coordinating with foreign regulators and 
international standard setting bodies on financial stability issues.191 As such, 
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve seem to be “more equal” than the other 
members of the FSOC, and when we talk about the prospect of the FSOC 
exercising power over its members, more often than not we are 
conceptualizing situations where the Chair of the Federal Reserve or the 
Secretary of the Treasury might use the FSOC to direct the other agencies to 
act in a particular way. Alternatively, when an FSOC member represents a 
commission (such as the SEC or the CFTC), he or she may use the FSOC as a 
forum for expressing his or her own personal views, rather than the consensus 
position of the full commission that would otherwise guide the agency.192 In 
such instances, the member may be attempting to use the FSOC as a vehicle to 
effect policy change within their own agency, because they cannot get their 
fellow commissioners to agree to such policy in the ordinary course. 
This discussion of interagency interactions is largely hypothetical. To date, 
the only real indication we have about how the FSOC will assert its powers 
over other agencies derives from the regulatory haggling over money market 
mutual fund (MMF) reform. By way of background, Mary Schapiro, the 
former Chair of the SEC, had attempted to propose a rule that sought to 
address risks that MMFs posed to financial stability, but she was unable to 
convince a majority of the SEC commissioners to release the rule for 
comment.193 Then-Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner urged the FSOC to 
recommend to the SEC (pursuant to section 120 of Dodd–Frank) that such 
reform was necessary.194 In November of 2012, the FSOC sought public 
comment on proposed recommendations to the SEC regarding three possible 
avenues of reform of MMFs, indicating that any of those reforms would help  
 
                                                                                                                     
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 58 (2014) (written 
testimony of Robert C. Hockett, Professor, Cornell University). 
 190 See infra notes 206–08 and accompanying text. 
 191 MURPHY & BERNIER, supra note 188, at 8. 
 192 Section 2(b) of now-defunct bill H.R. 4387, 113th Cong. (2014), sought to address 
this by giving each of the members of each agency with a multi-member commission a seat 
on the FSOC. Such a proposal, however, would most likely have rendered the FSOC 
unworkable, as it would have brought up to twenty more people to the table. Furthermore, 
because each agency would still have only had one vote, it would have required a second 
layer of consensus before the FSOC could take any action. See id. 
 193 Jill E. Fisch, The Broken Buck Stops Here: Embracing Sponsor Support in Money 
Market Fund Reform 19–21 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Law, 
Paper No. 275, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2456255 [http://perma.cc/5HBV-ES33]. 
 194 Id. at 22. 
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mitigate the dangers that MMFs pose to financial stability.195 In response, on 
June 5, 2013, the SEC promulgated a proposed rule that covered two potential 
avenues for reform, but each of these two avenues was on a much more 
limited scale than any of the FSOC’s proposals.196 The SEC’s rule was 
adopted as final, with some amendments, on July 23, 2014.197 Upon the 
release of these final rules, Treasury Secretary Lew, the current Treasury 
Secretary and chair of the FSOC, issued the somewhat cryptic statement that 
“[w]hile the SEC’s reforms will require careful consideration and continued 
monitoring of their effectiveness in addressing risks to financial stability, the 
SEC’s final rule is a significant step forward.”198 It remains to be seen whether 
the FSOC will take any further steps towards intervention.199 
                                                                                                                     
 195 The options were: 
1) [R]equiring MMFs to switch from a fixed to a floating NAV, 2) providing for a 
NAV capital buffer of up to 1%, supplied by a MMF sponsor together with a required 
minimum balance at risk for MMF investors, or 3) requiring a risk-based capital 
buffer of up to 3%, which could be combined with other risk-reducing measures. 
Id. at 22–23. 
 196 The Securities and Exchange Commission summarized the rule as follows: 
The first alternative proposal would require money market funds to sell and redeem 
shares based on the current market-based value of the securities in their underlying 
portfolios, rounded to the fourth decimal place (e.g., $1.0000), i.e., transact at a 
“floating” net asset value per share (“NAV”). The second alternative proposal would 
require money market funds to impose a liquidity fee (unless the fund’s board 
determines that it is not in the best interest of the fund) if a fund’s liquidity levels fell 
below a specified threshold and would permit the funds to suspend redemptions 
temporarily, i.e., to “gate” the fund under the same circumstances. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form 
PF, 78 Fed. Reg. 36,834 (proposed rule June 19, 2013). These more limited reforms have 
been critiqued by Sheila Bair as leaving “a number of money market funds, fund investors 
and the markets unprotected and at risk for destabilizing runs. It also creates real incentives 
for gaming and arbitrage.” Nathaniel Popper, S.E.C. Proposes Changes in Money Funds, 
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 5, 2013, 1:07 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/ 
05/s-e-c-votes-to-take-next-step-on-money-market-funds/ [http://perma.cc/Y8LW-BQQS]. 
 197 The changes made to the proposed rules include the removal of exemptions for 
institutional non-government money market funds, as well as requirements for increased 
diversification of portfolios, enhanced stress testing, and increased transparency. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 
Fed. Reg. 47,736 (final rule Aug. 14, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 
274, 279). 
 198 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement from Secretary Lew on the 
Final Money Market Mutual Fund Rule by the SEC (July 23, 2014), 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2583.aspx [http://perma.cc/ 
K79D-2DQS]. 
 199 The FSOC did indicate recently that it would look into the asset management 
industry more broadly, issuing a Notice Seeking Comment on Asset Management Products 
and Activities that stated that while the SEC “is undertaking several initiatives that would 
apply to investment companies and investment advisers regulated by the SEC and may 
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IV. CONCERNS REGARDING THE FSOC’S STRUCTURE AND MANDATE 
Given the youth of the FSOC, any analysis of the FSOC’s powers must by 
necessity be somewhat speculative. The interactions between the FSOC and 
the other financial regulatory agencies will, over time, add more color to our 
understanding of the FSOC. Even at the tender age of five, though, there are 
already reasons to be concerned about whether the FSOC is up to the vital 
challenge of promoting financial stability. 
This Article has already made the case that financial regulation should be 
used to proactively pursue financial stability: the social costs of ex post 
responses to financial stability, and their incomplete efficacy in mitigating the 
economic fallout from financial crises, dictate that a financial stability 
regulator should not simply allow instability to develop, and then attempt to 
clean it up afterwards.200 However, when the economy is performing well and 
the financial system seems to be working smoothly, any regulatory 
intervention will likely be met with tepid public support and strident industry 
opposition.201 Ideally, the FSOC would be structured in the way that best 
insulates it from these political realities, but as this Part will explore, there are 
flaws in the FSOC’s structure and mandate that will likely increase its 
susceptibility to the cycle of political economy and to regulatory capture. 
A. Problems with the FSOC’s Structure 
The FSOC is, at its core, a committee that is designed to work by 
“leverag[ing] the expertise that already exists at each [financial regulatory] 
agency,”202 rather than performing extensive regulatory functions itself. As 
such, the efficacy of the FSOC will be stunted if these individual agencies do 
not contribute to the FSOC’s financial stability mission. To put it another way, 
individual members of the FSOC will “come as advocates for their agency’s 
positions and as defenders of their agency’s turf and power,”203 and if the 
institutions that those members represent do not see financial stability as their 
end goal, a council of those members will not prioritize financial stability.204 
                                                                                                                     
address some of the risks described in this Notice[,] the SEC’s initiatives are not 
specifically focused on financial stability.” Notice Seeking Comment on Asset 
Management Products and Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. 77,488, 77,489 (Dec. 24, 2014) 
(footnote omitted). 
 200 See supra Part II. 
 201 See supra text accompanying notes 82–84. 
 202 FSOC FAQs, supra note 164. 
 203 Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual 
Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 807, 838–39 (2010). 
 204 Bar-Gill and Warren have noted that “[e]ffective regulation requires both authority 
and motivation.” Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 85 (2008). The agencies represented on the FSOC have historically had both 
authority and motivations other than financial stability: the OCC, the FDIC, and the 
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An international peer review of the United States’ financial regulatory system 
released by the Financial Stability Board in August 2013 raised some of these 
issues, noting: 
[T]he FSOC’s decisions and actions reflect the views of a wide range of 
agencies with different mandates and interests. This might affect in some 
cases the FSOC’s ability to take decisions in an effective and prompt manner, 
as the desire to reach a reasonable consensus among a large group of 
authorities might come at the expense of delivering clear and timely 
messages. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
. . . Furthermore, the scope of the [FSOC’s systemic] risk analysis 
currently is relatively narrow as it tends to reflect the sectoral perspectives of 
individual member agencies, rather than providing a system-wide view of 
interconnections and exposures to risks.205 
This Part will explore in detail these, and other, problems that the FSOC’s 
structure pose for financial stability regulation. 
1. Federal Reserve Dominance 
There is one member of the FSOC that is actively pursuing the goal of 
financial stability post-Crisis: although the Federal Reserve does not have an 
express statutory financial stability mandate,206 it takes the position that its 
“financial stability mandate is seen in the penumbra of the Federal Reserve  
 
                                                                                                                     
NCUA, for example, have tended to focus on banks and their safety and soundness, rather 
than on the stability of the financial system as a whole, or the macroeconomic effects of 
financial system failure. Id. at 90. Similarly, the SEC has traditionally focused on 
disclosure and investor protection, rather than on addressing structural issues within 
financial markets. Walter Werner, The SEC as Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755, 755 
(1984). 
 205 FIN. STABILITY BD., PEER REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (Aug. 2013), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130827.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
6XPH-V3GJ]. 
 206 The Federal Reserve’s founding legislation provides only that:  
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open 
Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit 
aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase 
production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable 
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. 
12 U.S.C. § 225(a) (2012). 
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Act, and that is legally sufficient.”207 Given the importance of financial 
stability, it is in many respects a good thing that a powerful body like the 
Federal Reserve has committed to preserving it.208 However, there is a concern 
that—despite the best of intentions and a commitment to a macroprudential 
approach to financial regulation209—the Federal Reserve’s efforts will be 
primarily informed by its historic concern with the safety and soundness of 
banking institutions,210 and that it will therefore monitor threats to the 
financial system through bank-tinted lenses.211 Dodd–Frank itself encourages 
                                                                                                                     
 207 Thomas C. Baxter stated: 
The Federal Reserve’s financial stability mandate is seen in the penumbra of the 
Federal Reserve Act, and that is legally sufficient. . . . [L]eading economic thinkers 
would now say, and the financial crisis seems to offer us the perfect illustration, that 
price stability and maximum employment are possible only in a context of financial 
stability. 
Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
Remarks at the Future of Banking Regulation and Supervision in the EU Conference, 
Financial Stability: The Role of the Federal Reserve System (Nov. 15, 2013) (transcript 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/bax131120.html [http:// 
perma.cc/Y9FP-44T3]). 
 208 It is, of course, possible that commitment to this unofficial mandate will wane over 
time. The Federal Reserve has often been critiqued for neglecting its statutorily mandated 
focus on maximum employment in favor of a single-minded focus on inflation.  
The Federal Reserve: The Other Mandate, ECONOMIST (Dec. 15, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21568426-fed-specifies-unemploy 
ment-threshold-raising-rates-other-mandate [http://perma.cc/KMP6-E4BY]. It is possible 
that the Federal Reserve’s enthusiasm for its implicit financial stability mandate could 
suffer the same fate. 
 209 Bernanke, supra note 5, at 5. For example, the Federal Reserve has created a new 
“Office of Financial Stability Policy and Research” to “identif[y] and analyze[] potential 
threats to financial stability; monitor[] financial markets, institutions, and structures; and 
assess[] and recommend[] policy alternatives to address these threats.” The Economists: 
Office of Financial Stability Policy and Research, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/fsprstaff.htm [http://perma.cc/9EG9-BMLH] 
(last updated Oct. 13, 2015). 
 210 In addition to being the United States’ central bank, the Federal Reserve is (and has 
been since well before the Financial Crisis) the primary federal regulator for bank holding 
companies, and for state-chartered banks that are a member of the Federal Reserve System. 
CARNELL ET AL., supra note 77, at 61. 
 211 Taylor has argued that “the expertise necessary to regulate investment banks and 
insurance companies does not naturally reside in central banks.” Taylor, supra note 80, at 
85. Providers of non-banking financial services who will be regulated by the Federal 
Reserve if designated as a SIFI pursuant to section 113 of Dodd–Frank have been 
particularly vociferous about their concerns that the Federal Reserve will take a “one-size-
fits-all” banking-style approach to regulating these SIFIs. For example, the Chamber of 
Commerce has alleged that the FSOC is “over-populated with bank regulators and unduly 
influenced by that regulatory perspective.” Letter from David Hirshmann, President & 
CEO, Ctr. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness, to Timothy Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of 
the Treasury 5 (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/ 
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the Federal Reserve to respond to stability threats in a bank-centric way: 
section 115 encourages the Federal Reserve to apply heightened prudential 
requirements that are reminiscent of typical bank regulatory tools to the non-
bank financial institutions that have been designated as SIFIs.212 However, as 
this section will explore, to the extent that the dominance of the Chair of the 
Federal Reserve within the FSOC shuts out other agencies’ non-bank 
perspectives about how risks might build and be transmitted through the 
financial system (and how such risks should be addressed), such dominance is 
a cause for concern. 
The organizational economics literature suggests that the best way to 
cultivate regulatory imagination about potential risks to stability is to 
synthesize inputs from regulators with different perspectives;213 non-banking 
perspectives about threats to financial stability are unique and valuable 
contributions to financial stability regulation.214 Financial institutions can 
certainly fail because of runs on their short-term funding, and if an institution 
is sufficiently large, then its failure can certainly have systemic ramifications. 
However, institutional failure may not always result from a funding run, and 
the failure of a number of smaller, non-bank institutions with correlated 
                                                                                                                     
uploads/2010/04/2012-11.5-MMF-Letter-to-Geithner.pdf [http://perma.cc/FX66-SSTS]. 
One of the key supervisory innovations following the Financial Crisis was the 
commencement of annual stress tests of large banks and designated SIFIs to determine 
whether “a covered company has the capital, on a total consolidated basis, necessary to 
absorb losses and continue its operations by maintaining ready access to funding, meeting 
its obligations to creditors and other counterparties, and continuing to serve as a credit 
intermediary under adverse economic and financial conditions.” Again, this focus on 
capital reflects typical bank regulatory notions about the importance of safety and 
soundness of institutions See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DODD–FRANK 
ACT STRESS TEST 2013: SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS  
(Mar. 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/dfast_2013_results_ 
20130314.pdf [http://perma.cc/9JJS-NFE3]. 
 212 As noted by William M. Butler: 
Nonbank SIFIs, many for the first time, will be subject to oversight by the Federal 
Reserve and regulations that include capital requirements, leverage limits, liquidity 
requirements, resolution plans or living wills, credit exposure report requirements, 
concentration limits, contingent capital requirements, public disclosures, short-term 
debt limits, and other risk management requirements that the FSOC may recommend 
to the Federal Reserve. 
Butler, supra note 174, at 668. 
 213 In complex and rapidly changing environments, “a loosely knit, decentralized 
structure of multiple agencies is likely to be optimal,” because a decentralized structure 
allows for more and new ideas to be developed and shared. Luis Garicano & Richard A. 
Posner, Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective, 19 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 151, 157 (2005). 
 214 It is beneficial for the FSOC to hear views about systemic risk from bodies other 
than the Federal Reserve. Erik F. Gerding, The Subprime Crisis and the Link Between 
Consumer Financial Protection and Systemic Risk, 4 FIU L. REV. 435, 461 (2009). 
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exposures can also precipitate instability.215 Financial instability can arise 
even when institutions do not fail, perhaps because a problem with a 
widespread asset class has damaged confidence in a market such that capital 
intermediation is interrupted.216 As such, financial stability regulators need to 
be concerned with much more than the safety and soundness of banks and 
large financial institutions: they need to be constantly probing interlinkages 
between different institutions and markets, and anticipating potential shocks 
that could ripple along those interlinkages.217 
To its credit, the FSOC has been exploring novel ways in which insurance 
firms can pose systemic risk, not restricting its analysis to large insurers’ 
dependence on short-term funding (although concerns about such reliance 
have indeed loomed large in the FSOC’s decisions to designate AIG, 
Prudential, and MetLife as SIFIs).218 For example, the FSOC has raised 
concerns about the dependence of other financial firms on insurers for 
coverage, and the consequences for those other financial firms if such 
coverage were to become unavailable as a result of “a spike in claims due to 
correlated risks, other types of actuarial miscalculations or under-reserving, 
undercapitalization, or portfolio losses.”219 However, McCoy notes that to 
date, the FSOC has not been very clear in articulating exactly what types of 
insurance coverage are susceptible to such an analysis, and what other 
financial firms might be significantly harmed should coverage dry up.220 A 
close familiarity with the insurance industry is vital in fully developing such 
theories. Additionally, insurance regulators have the best information about 
the investments made by insurance companies (particularly in corporate bond 
markets), and an understanding of this demand can be integral to 
understanding the development of bubbles in such markets.221 Insurance 
experts must therefore be heard on matters of financial stability. 
                                                                                                                     
 215 “[W]e should note, the weakest link in the financial stability chain might be small, 
rather than large, financial intermediaries.” Eric S. Rosengren, President & CEO, Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Bos., Keynote Remarks at the Stanford Finance Forum, Defining 
Financial Stability, and Some Policy Implications of Applying the Definition, 9 (June 3, 
2011) (transcript available at http://www.bostonfed.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2011/ 
060311/060311.pdf [http://perma.cc/NJL9-TUD6]). 
 216 Id. at 4. 
 217 The shock that precipitates financial instability might not even come from within 
the financial system itself: as the FSOC recently identified, it could be an act of 
cyberterrorism targeting financial system infrastructure. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT 
COUNCIL, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 5 (2011) [FSOC REPORT]. 
 218 For a discussion of the FSOC’s concerns regarding the susceptibility of AIG, 
Prudential, and MetLife to runs, see Patricia A. McCoy, Systemic Risk Oversight and the 
Shifting Balance of State and Federal Authority over Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 42–48), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/view 
content.cgi?article=1938&context=lsfp [http://perma.cc/N4HC-UD3E]. 
 219 Id. (manuscript at 66). 
 220 Id. (manuscript at 65–67). 
 221 Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 76, at 1589–99. 
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Similarly, as the “cop on the beat” taking complaints regarding consumer 
financial products, the CFPB is likely to be the first agency to see evidence of 
a bubble in a particular class of consumer financial products (including 
products that are offered by institutions that are not otherwise regulated by any 
financial regulatory agency),222 and so its input is key to the financial stability 
project. Patterns of consumer complaints with respect to a particular financial 
institution can also be an early warning of problems with that institution223—
other indicators of trouble (like the regulatory capital standards that are the 
focus of bank-centric regulation) tend to lag behind.224 Finally, consumer 
protection regulation can promote financial stability by preventing or 
mitigating negative market distortions that result from imperfectly informed 
(and bubble-creating) consumer choices.225 The CFPB’s input is therefore also 
integral to financial stability regulation. 
The SEC’s expertise with regard to securities markets is also invaluable. 
For example, a number of highly publicized computer glitches in recent years 
have focused regulatory scrutiny on high frequency trading, including the 
Flash Crash on May 6, 2010,226 and the losses suffered by Knight Capital on 
August 1, 2012.227 While neither of these market disruptions had a broad 
systemic impact, many are concerned that similar incidents could precipitate a 
full-blown crisis in the future.228 The SEC is also likely to know more than the 
                                                                                                                     
 222 “The jurisdiction of the Bureau . . . extends to the world of payday lenders, credit 
counselors and pawn shops.” Donald N. Lamson & Hilary Allen, Consumer Financial 
Protection: It’s a Smaller World After All, 96 BNA’S BANKING REP. 552 (Mar. 22, 2011). 
 223 See generally Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case 
Study of the British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. 
REV. 735 (2009). 
 224 ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 190 (2014). 
 225 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 204, at 58–59. It is also worth exploring whether the 
CFPB could or should engage in class-action-like contract modification of oppressive 
contracts that are causing the build-up of systemic risk. In this way, the CFPB could act as 
a “safety valve,” releasing risk from the system. For a discussion of the need for such 
safety valves, see Pistor, supra note 94, at 329. 
 226 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010: REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF 
THE CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY 
ISSUES 2 (Sept. 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9RGN-AJN5]. 
 227 Nathaniel Popper, Knight Capital Says Trading Glitch Cost It $440 Million, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 2, 2012, 9:07 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/02/ 
knight-capital-says-trading-mishap-cost-it-440-million/?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/3ND8-HBG6]. 
 228 Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 706 (2013). 
[A]lgorithmic trades tend to be correlated, suggesting that the HFT strategies used in 
the market are not as diverse as those used by human traders. In this context, shocks 
hitting the small number of very active algorithmic traders might affect the entire 
market. And, because high frequency trading firms are often very lightly capitalised, 
this could generate failures. Handling the corresponding counterparty risk could be 
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Federal Reserve about the various brokers or dealers that act as market makers 
for securities.229 Because these market makers “stand[] ready to buy and sell a 
particular stock on a regular and continuous basis at a publicly quoted 
price,”230 if a number of market makers are compromised, then liquidity 
within the financial system might be seriously disrupted.231 A focus on the 
workings of the securities markets is thus necessary as part of the financial 
stability project, even if none of the players therein are deemed large enough 
to be a problem from a “too big to fail” perspective. 
The foregoing does not purport in any way to be an exhaustive discussion 
of the sources of systemic risk in our financial system. However, the examples 
given here are sufficient to illustrate that a limited focus on the solvency of 
banks and other large financial institutions runs the risk of neglecting 
important systemic risks, particularly those being created by the herd behavior 
of smaller institutions.232 As such, the efficacy of financial stability regulation 
is likely to be stunted unless all of the financial regulatory agencies—not just 
the Federal Reserve—commit to the task of identifying and addressing threats 
to financial stability. It is also worth noting that if all of the regulatory 
agencies were to rise to this challenge, then supervision and monitoring of 
non-bank institutions’ destabilizing behaviors could be effected without 
designating institutions as SIFIs subject to the Federal Reserve’s jurisdiction—
potentially neutralizing the politically-charged issue of SIFI designation.233 
2. Treasury Dominance 
The dominance of the Treasury Secretary within the FSOC raises more 
concerns than the prominence of the Federal Reserve. In addition to being the 
Chairperson of the FSOC, the Treasury Secretary has perhaps the greatest 
powers of any member of the FSOC (including the power to set the FSOC’s 
agenda, and to veto any designation of a financial institution as subject to 
heightened prudential supervision).234 Furthermore, the Treasury Department 
                                                                                                                     
daunting, given that HFT firms turn over their positions many times a day, while 
clearing systems operate at a much lower frequency. Combined, these elements could 
generate systemic market disruptions. 
Bruno Biais & Paul Woolley, The Flip Side: High Frequency Trading, FIN. WORLD,  
Feb. 2012, at 34, 35, http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/researchProgrammes/paulWoolleyCentre/ 
pdf/FinancialWorldArticle.pdf [http://perma.cc/6TES-XPCJ]. 
 229 Brokers and dealers are regulated by the SEC pursuant to section 15 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o 
(2012). 
 230 Market Maker, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ 
mktmaker.htm [http://perma.cc/4TUX-V27H] (last modified Mar. 17, 2000). 
 231 Rosengren, supra note 215, at 13. 
 232 Stiglitz, supra note 97, at 17. 
 233 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 234 See supra text accompanying notes 186–88. The Treasury Secretary is also 
responsible for appointing the person who controls the oral hearing proceedings for a 
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provides the FSOC with much of its administrative support,235 and also houses 
and exerts control over the OFR236 (which is a primary source of the FSOC’s 
data and analysis regarding emerging threats to financial stability).237 This Part 
will explore how placement of a political figure like the Treasury Secretary at 
the apex of the FSOC may jeopardize the FSOC’s ability to fulfill its financial 
stability mandate. 
As this Article has explored, political economy is one of the greatest 
difficulties that ex ante financial stability regulation faces.238 The vagaries of 
politics have long been thought to be inimical to good financial regulation; 
instead, financial regulatory agency independence has traditionally been 
favored because it allows for high technical expertise, policy stability and 
uniformity, and also a longer term perspective239 (the latter of which is 
particularly essential to financial stability regulation).240 However, given that 
the Treasury Secretary is a presidential cabinet appointee removable at will, he 
or she is less insulated from the political whims of the executive than any of 
the other members of the FSOC,241 and is more likely to be susceptible to 
“timing considerations, adverse public opinion, and interest group 
pressures.”242 Thus, by placing the Treasury Secretary at the pinnacle of the 
                                                                                                                     
financial institution seeking to dispute its designation as a SIFI. Butler, supra note 174, at 
678. 
 235 The GAO reported that:  
[The FSOC] has established a dedicated policy office within Treasury’s Office of 
Domestic Finance, led by a Deputy Assistant Secretary, which functions as the FSOC 
Secretariat. Among other duties, the policy office works with staff of other FSOC 
members to support FSOC in its day-to-day operations by helping to draft rules, 
studies, and reports and prepare and circulate relevant materials to agency members 
prior to council meetings. The office also serves as a mechanism to bring issues to the 
council quickly. 
GAO-12-886, supra note 170, at 12. 
 236 The OFR must consult with the Secretary of the Treasury in connection with any 
rulemaking, the establishment of its budget, and personnel hiring and compensation. 
Jennifer S. Taub, Great Expectations for the Office of Financial Research, in WILL IT 
WORK? HOW WILL WE KNOW? THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REFORM 23, 24–25 (Michael 
Konczal ed., Roosevelt Institute 2010), http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/ 
Will%20It%20Work%20How%20Will%20We%20Know_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/BN2V-
ARMP]. 
 237 Dodd–Frank Act § 152(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5342 (2012). 
 238 See supra text accompanying notes 81–96. 
 239 Gadinis, supra note 176, at 340. 
 240 Allen, supra note 31, at 206. 
 241 Gadinis, supra note 176, at 332; see also DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: 
UNDERSTANDING THE DODD–FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 12 
(2011) (“Because the Treasury secretary is directly responsible to the President, he is the 
least independent, and the most political, of the financial regulators. Yet the Treasury 
secretary is given leadership responsibility on the new Financial Stability Oversight 
Council and in other areas.”). 
 242 Gadinis, supra note 176, at 388. 
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only United States body expressly charged with addressing threats to financial 
stability, Dodd–Frank has to some extent reversed the guiding principle of 
independence and increased the susceptibility of the FSOC, and financial 
stability regulation, to the whims of political economy.243 
In boom times, it may be too much to expect that a Treasury-led FSOC 
will aggressively pursue financial stability (for example, by recommending 
that individual agencies apply heightened safeguards to profitable activities 
pursuant to section 120, or by designating profitable institutions as subject to 
enhanced regulatory scrutiny pursuant to section 113). By virtue of its control 
over the FSOC’s agenda, the Treasury Secretary has the power to prevent the 
FSOC from even discussing potential sources of systemic risk that are 
politically “too hot to handle.” It has also been argued that the Treasury’s 
control over the OFR could ensure that the OFR’s information gathering and 
analysis functions reflect the politically expedient policy of “defend[ing] 
existing practices of the financial sector and provid[ing] generous support 
when important firms need assistance.”244 Furthermore, while this Article has 
largely focused on the difficulties of regulating for financial stability when the 
financial system is (or appears to be) performing well, the increased 
politicization of financial stability regulation can also be problematic once a 
financial crisis has developed. As Gadinis notes, “there is a significant risk that 
voters, in the midst of uncertainty and widespread skepticism, might press 
politicians to refrain from intervening in the financial industry when 
intervening would be otherwise appropriate.”245 As such, the Treasury 
Secretary’s role in the FSOC is potentially problematic in bad times as well as 
good. 
3. Broader Coordination Challenges 
The dominance of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve within the FSOC 
is thus undesirable in many respects. Unfortunately, the heads of the other 
financial regulatory agencies are unlikely to serve as a counterbalance within 
the FSOC. It is difficult for the various financial regulatory agencies, all of 
which have pre-existing regulatory priorities and identities that potentially 
conflict with a focus on financial stability matters, to coordinate on financial 
stability matters.246 Going forward, these agencies are even less likely to focus 
                                                                                                                     
 243 Barkow notes that when a politicized executive agency is hierarchically superior to, 
and able to direct, independent regulatory agencies, then the independence of those 
agencies is rendered meaningless. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding 
Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 51 (2010). 
 244 Johnson, supra note 172. 
 245 Gadinis, supra note 176, at 385. 
 246 According to the GAO: 
[The] FSOC’s effectiveness [in providing for a more comprehensive view of threats to 
U.S. financial stability] hinges to a large extent on collaboration among its many 
members, almost all of whom come from state and federal agencies with their own 
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on financial stability issues as the economy improves, and the importance of 
financial stability regulation fades from public attention. Furthermore, the very 
existence of the FSOC may disincentivize such focus: the FSOC may provide 
a pretext for the other financial regulatory agencies to shirk any responsibility 
they might otherwise have felt to take action in the face of financial 
instability.247 
To be clear, the other financial regulatory agencies do not have any 
express responsibilities with respect to financial stability. However, the 
statutory requirement in section 112(b) of Dodd–Frank that each voting 
member of the FSOC submit an annual statement to Congress regarding extant 
threats to financial stability gives each such member (and their agency) an 
implicit direction to monitor such threats.248 Sections 113 and 804 implicitly 
direct each member to keep an eye on SIFIs and market utilities, in order to 
determine whether they should be designated as requiring heightened 
supervision.249 Similarly, section 120 implicitly directs each member to 
monitor potentially problematic financial activities or practices, to enable them 
to determine whether the FSOC should make a recommendation to apply new 
or heightened standards or safeguards to such activities or practices.250 Given 
that none of these obligations are particularly firm, though, there is a real 
possibility that the FSOC’s members will seek to shirk such responsibilities—
particularly when taking action is too challenging or politically unpalatable—
and attribute blame for any notable failures to the FSOC as a whole.251 
                                                                                                                     
specific statutory missions. In testifying on the coordination of Dodd–Frank 
rulemakings assigned to specific FSOC members, before the U.S. House Financial 
Services Committee in October 2011, the chairperson of FSOC recognized this 
challenge. He noted that the coordination challenge in the rulemaking process was 
hard because the Dodd–Frank Act left in place a financial system with a complicated 
set of independent agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and different 
responsibilities. 
GAO-12-886, supra note 170, at 8. 
 247 Regarding the risk of shirking, see Barkow, supra note 243, at 56 (“It is all too easy 
for agencies to point fingers at each other with no one ultimately held accountable.”). 
 248 Dodd–Frank Act § 112(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012). 
 249 See Id. §§ 113, 804. 
 250 See Id. § 120. 
 251 The beginnings of such a dynamic can perhaps be inferred from a recent speech by 
SEC Chair Mary Jo White, which included the text: 
Truly tackling systemic risk in any area, obviously, demands a broader program 
than one agency can execute. Systemic risks cannot be addressed alone—they are, 
after all, “systemic.” Risks that could cascade through our financial system could have 
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Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) is an important forum for studying and 
identifying systemic risks across different markets and market participants. The 
market perspective that the SEC brings is an essential component of FSOC’s efforts.  
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The potential for the FSOC to serve as a pretext for shirking has not yet 
been explored in the financial regulatory literature, but there is a burgeoning 
administrative law literature on interagency interaction that may assist here. 
Freeman and Rossi, for example, have considered whether “where 
responsibility is shared, agencies might be more inclined to shirk their 
duties.”252 They conclude that such shirking is, in fact, often prevented by 
coordination mechanisms that facilitate interagency monitoring.253 The 
coordination mechanisms that Freeman and Rossi have in mind include 
mandated interagency consultation,254 which is one of the key functions of the 
FSOC’s mandated quarterly meetings.255 However, there are a number of 
reasons to be less than sanguine regarding the prospect of the FSOC as a 
facilitator of interagency monitoring in the financial stability context.256 
First, any requirement for the FSOC’s members (and their agencies) to 
monitor threats to financial stability on an ongoing basis is, at best, implicit.257 
It is difficult for any member of the FSOC (or the public) to hold another 
member accountable for shirking such nebulous obligations. Although the 
FSOC could use its recommendation power under section 120 of the Dodd–
Frank Act to bring a shirking agency into line, because it has limited resources 
of its own, the FSOC qua FSOC is in no position to monitor financial 
regulatory agencies.258 Monitoring must therefore come from the FSOC’s 
members and their agencies, and given that those agencies have at best 
implicit financial stability obligations themselves, they are not required to 
focus on potentially destabilizing activities of other agencies. The only players 
likely to take action in this context are the Federal Reserve, which views itself 
as having a financial stability mandate, and the Treasury, if the political winds 
                                                                                                                     
And FSOC’s current review of the potential risks to the stability of U.S. financial 
system of asset managers is a complement to the work we are now undertaking. 
Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the New York Times DealBook 
Opportunities for Tomorrow Conference, Enhancing Risk Monitoring and Regulatory 
Safeguards for the Asset Management Industry (Dec. 11, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543677722#.VKy7Slu61UQ [http:// 
perma.cc/E6TH-D4EE]). White gave this speech the week before the FSOC published its 
Notice Seeking Comment on Asset Management Products and Activities, supra note 199, 
perhaps suggesting a pre-agreed division of labor whereby responsibility for systemic risk 
would fall on the FSOC rather than the SEC. 
 252 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 177, at 1187. 
 253 Id. at 1188. 
 254 Id. at 1157, 1160. 
 255 See FSOC REPORT, supra note 217, at 129. 
 256 Ongoing cooperation and commitment with respect to financial stability regulation 
should be distinguished from instances of joint-rulemaking required by Dodd–Frank, 
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 257 See supra notes 248–51. 
 258 This is in contrast to situations where there is a true lead agency that is driving the 
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are blowing against a particular financial agency, product, or activity. As this 
Part has already established, it is less than ideal that interagency monitoring 
always be informed by such a politicized or bank-centric perspective. 
It is possible that, even in the absence of any statutory obligation for the 
financial regulatory agencies to pursue financial stability, each of those 
agencies may be incentivized to monitor each other’s activities because of the 
fear of the reputational harm they will suffer if a financial crisis occurs: 
Marisam has argued that interagency monitoring will prevent shirking when 
the activities of one agency have negative externalities for other agencies with 
overlapping competencies.259 However, Marisam acknowledges that the risk 
of shirking rises when various agencies are responsible for the same task, 
instead of being responsible for different information or subtasks, because it is 
easier to spread blame for any regulatory failures.260 Financial crises are such 
complex events that it is difficult to pinpoint the exact cause of such crises,261 
and thus to point fingers at particular regulatory failures. Furthermore, there is 
a lot of overlap in financial regulatory agency competencies—the OCC, the 
FDIC, and the Federal Reserve cover very similar territory when regulating 
banks and bank holding companies,262 as do the SEC and the CFTC when they 
are regulating derivatives.263 Given these circumstances, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the history of financial agency interactions suggests a tendency 
for agencies to shirk regulatory responsibilities that are unpopular with the 
regulated industry. Banking regulators’ approach to consumer financial 
protection prior to the Financial Crisis is illustrative of this tendency: as one 
author noted, “because consumer protection has been everyone’s 
responsibility, it has been no one’s responsibility, and accountability and 
performance have suffered therewith.”264 If the FSOC is viewed as having sole 
responsibility for financial stability, and if the FSOC is not sufficiently robust 
or has insufficient resources to actually pursue those financial stability 
objectives, financial stability may also become the responsibility of no one (or 
no one other than the Federal Reserve and Treasury). 
To date, the FSOC’s response to its coordination problems has largely 
consisted of forming committees, intended to “support collaboration among 
FSOC members both on a formal and informal basis.”265 These committees 
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include a Systemic Risk Committee, a Designation of Non-bank Financial 
Companies Committee, a Designation of Financial Market Utilities 
Committee, and a Heightened Prudential Standards Committee.266 
Membership of these committees may, to some extent, serve to train individual 
agency focus on financial stability matters. However, because the FSOC “does 
not keep detailed records of deliberations or discussions that take place at the 
council’s meetings or at the committee level,”267 there would be little evidence 
available from the committee’s deliberations to hold any agency accountable 
for shirking its implicit obligations. Shirking could perhaps be reduced by 
requiring more transparency regarding the deliberations of the FSOC and its 
committees (although transparency with regard to financial stability 
deliberations is fraught for other reasons),268 but I suspect that this, and other 
process-oriented reforms suggested by the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO),269 would have a limited impact on the commitment of the FSOC’s 
member agencies to financial stability concerns. Similarly, although the FSOC 
is overseen by a Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight 
(CIGFO), to date this council has kept a relatively low profile and focused on 
the FSOC’s compliance with discrete processes set out in Dodd–Frank.270 
Again, I suspect that the CIGFO will have a limited impact on the commitment 
of the FSOC’s member agencies to financial stability concerns. 
Other reform options have been suggested by Representative Scott Garrett 
(R-NJ), and Senator David Vitter (R-LA), both of whom have introduced bills 
proposing to restructure the FSOC.271 Garrett’s bill died with the end of the 
113th Congress in January 2015, but if it had been enacted, section 2(b) 
thereof would have made every member of the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors, the SEC, the CFTC, the FDIC, and the National Credit Union 
                                                                                                                     
 266 There is also a Deputies Committee, an Orderly Liquidation Committee, and a Data 
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 268 In its transparency policy, the FSOC notes that: 
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Administration (NCUA) a member of the FSOC—bringing twenty more 
people to the table at any FSOC meeting on financial stability matters (but still 
giving each agency only one vote, requiring each multi-party commission to 
agree to take action before the FSOC as a whole could do so).272 Furthermore, 
section 2(c) of the bill would have required that: 
[A]t any FSOC meeting . . . [e]ven if the meeting was being held in private, it 
could be attended by up to 83 legislators—the 61 members of the House 
Financial Services Committee and the 22 members of the Senate Banking 
Committee. If staff members from the FSOC member agencies assembled for 
a meeting, the Financial Services and Banking Committee staffs would also 
have to be invited.273 
The combined effect of these provisions would have been to increase the 
susceptibility of the FSOC to political pressure, and to make the FSOC more 
cumbersome and stymie its ability to act.274 
Vitter’s bill, titled the “Terminating the Expansion of Too-Big-To-Fail Act 
of 2015”275 was introduced in January of 2015. The majority of Vitter’s bill is 
focused on repealing the FSOC’s designation power.276 However, several 
provisions of Vitter’s bill reach beyond the designation process and have the 
potential to limit the FSOC’s ability to discharge its financial stability mandate 
more generally. These include: (i) the repeal of section 120(d)(3) of Dodd–
Frank, which directs the FSOC to consider legislation regulating non-bank 
financial institutions that have no primary federal regulator, but pose risks to 
financial stability;277 (ii) the repeal of sections 216 and 217 of Dodd–Frank, 
which require studies relating to domestic and international procedures for the 
resolution of non-bank financial institutions;278 and (iii) the repeal of the entire 
Title VIII of Dodd–Frank, which relates to regulation of payment and clearing 
and settlement systems (sometimes referred to as the “plumbing” of the 
financial system).279 As Part V will explore in more detail, reform of the 
FSOC needs to move in the opposite direction to the Garrett and Vitter Bills. 
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B. Problems with the FSOC’s Mandate 
The preceding Part explored why the FSOC, as a committee of regulators 
dominated by the Federal Reserve and the Secretary of the Treasury, is not 
optimally structured to address threats to financial stability. As this Part will 
explore, the FSOC’s statutory financial stability mandate is also less than 
ideal. 
The FSOC’s mandate is set out in section 112(a)(1) of Dodd–Frank, and 
reads as follows: 
The purposes of the Council are— 
 
(A) to identify risks to the financial stability of the United States that 
could arise from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing 
activities, of large, interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank 
financial companies, or that could arise outside the financial services 
marketplace; 
 
(B) to promote market discipline, by eliminating expectations on the part 
of shareholders, creditors, and counterparties of such companies that the 
Government will shield them from losses in the event of failure; and 
 
(C) to respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States 
financial system.280 
The most obvious problem with this mandate is the inclusion of section 
112(a)(1)(B), which seems to be at cross-purposes with the rest of the 
mandate. Although one of the stated purposes of the Dodd–Frank legislation is 
to end expectations of emergency governmental support for the financial 
industry, the general consensus is that these expectations of intervention—and 
the moral hazard they create—persist post-Dodd–Frank.281 While it is 
preferable to proactively address potential financial stability concerns, 
emergency measures may well be required if such proactive regulation fails.282 
As such, well-designed ex post safety nets should be formalized in advance to 
allow the FSOC to carry out its mandated purpose in section 112(a)(1)(C): to 
“[r]espond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial 
system.”283 The ban in section 112(a)(1)(B) on formalizing any kind of safety 
net in advance will only ensure that if intervention does become necessary 
                                                                                                                     
 280 Dodd–Frank Act § 112(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012). 
 281 See, e.g., JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 64, at 207; Cheryl D. Block, Measuring 
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 283 Dodd–Frank Act § 112(a)(1)(C). 
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(and if a crisis is large enough, there will most likely be sufficient political 
pressure to intervene), it will be ad hoc in nature.284 
A more fundamental (but less obvious) problem with the FSOC’s mandate 
is the lack of clarity regarding the concepts of “financial stability” and 
“stability of the United States financial system.” These concepts are clearly 
central to subsections 112(a)(1)(A) and (C),285 but Dodd–Frank does not 
provide any definition of “financial stability.” I have argued elsewhere that 
financial stability means both the absence of financial crisis and the financial 
system’s smooth functioning and ability to absorb (rather than amplify) shocks 
such as tail-risks,286 and the FSOC seems to accept this approach. In its 2011 
Annual Report, the FSOC stated that “[a] stable financial system should not be 
the source of, nor amplify the impact of, shocks.”287 However, as this Part will 
explore, an ad hoc description buried in the FSOC’s annual report does not 
carry sufficient weight to focus regulatory attention on financial stability 
issues in boom times. Furthermore, this informal description does not address 
the normative question of why financial stability should be a policy goal in the 
first place. 
If financial instability only affected the profitability and solvency of 
financial institutions themselves, then there would be no need for financial 
stability regulation, nor to intervene when financial institutions or markets 
failed.288 Unfortunately, because of “the close linkages between financial 
stability and the health of the real economy,”289 “a distinguishing feature 
of . . . financial instability is that innocent bystanders get hurt.”290 As such, the 
FSOC’s mandate should reflect that the financial system is a means to an end 
(i.e., it exists to facilitate payments and the distribution of capital, as well as to 
manage risk, so that the economy beyond the financial system can grow), 
rather than an end in itself. However, the text of Dodd–Frank does not clearly 
                                                                                                                     
 284 Id. § 112(a)(1)(B). 
 285 Id. § 112(a)(1)(A), (C). 
 286 Allen, supra note 53, at 943–44. 
 287 See FSOC REPORT, supra note 217, at 3. It should be noted that the FSOC is 
sometimes inconsistent in its approach to “financial stability.” In the FSOC’s rules 
implementing section 113 of Dodd–Frank with respect to the supervision and regulation of 
non-bank financial companies, the FSOC stated that it “will consider a ‘threat to the 
financial stability of the United States’ to exist if there would be an impairment of financial 
intermediation or of financial market functioning that would be sufficiently severe to inflict 
significant damage on the broader economy.” 12 C.F.R. § 1310.23 (2013). Admittedly, this 
definition applies only in a particular context (i.e., when determining whether non-bank 
financial companies should be subjected to heightened prudential regulation), but it is 
inconsistent with the FSOC’s general approach articulated in its Annual Report because 
this latter definition focuses exclusively on the absence of crisis, and does not incorporate 
concepts of resilience or robustness. See FSOC REPORT, supra note 217, at ii–iii. 
 288 As the FSOC noted in its 2011 Annual Report, it is concerned with “the stability of 
the financial system as a whole, as opposed to the risk facing individual financial 
institutions or market participants.” See FSOC REPORT, supra note 217, at 132. 
 289 Crockett, supra note 81, at 8. 
 290 Allen & Wood, supra note 18, at 160. 
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convey this message.291 In particular, because the FSOC’s statutory mandate 
expressly references financial institutions and the financial system without 
mentioning externalities, the broader economy, or macroeconomic growth, it 
could be read as implying that the FSOC should concern itself with the 
financial sector qua financial sector, rather than the consequences of financial 
system failure for society at large. 
To be clear, there is nothing in the FSOC’s mandate that expressly 
prevents it from approaching financial stability as a means to promoting 
broader economic prosperity. The problem is that there is nothing in the 
FSOC’s mandate that requires it to take this approach to financial stability 
either. Regulators often lack public backing for their endeavors to promote 
public goods like financial stability,292 and without a constant statutory 
reminder of what financial stability really is and whom it concerns, the goal of 
financial stability can lose salience and legitimacy in times when the financial 
system seems to be functioning normally.293 Furthermore, as Dodd–Frank is 
currently worded, there would be no statutory grounds for holding the FSOC 
accountable if it follows the path of least resistance and ignores externalities, 
focusing instead on the financial sector as an end in itself. Given that many 
financial regulators have a dubious pre-Crisis track record of prioritizing 
industry profitability (in the guise of efficiency) over broader public welfare 
concerns,294 it seems particularly remiss that the FSOC’s statutory mandate 
does not emphasize the importance of avoiding the externalities of financial 
instability that affect those beyond financial institutions (and beyond their 
shareholders, creditors and counterparties). 
Instead, there are several legislative directions in Dodd–Frank that the 
FSOC focus on efficiency and market discipline,295 which could prove 
particularly useful to industry participants seeking to challenge financial 
stability regulation. Judicial review is intended to ensure that the FSOC’s 
actions accord with its statutory mandate and powers,296 but in the absence of 
                                                                                                                     
 291 Dodd–Frank has been criticized for failing to “articulate the principle for balancing 
the public interest in preserving financial stability and limiting systemic risk against the 
private interests of financial market participants in pursuing economic gain.” Saule T. 
Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Towards Tripartism in Financial 
Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 634 (2012). 
 292 Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in 
Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 473 (2010); Short, supra note 83, at 680. 
 293 Brett McDonnell, Dampening Financial Regulatory Cycles, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1597, 
1605 (2013). 
 294 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to 
Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1328–59 (2013). 
 295 For example, section 112(a)(2)(N) of Dodd–Frank directs the FSOC to annually 
report to and testify before Congress regarding “recommendations (I) to enhance the 
integrity, efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of United States financial markets; (II) 
to promote market discipline; and (III) to maintain investor confidence.” Dodd–Frank Act 
§ 112(a)(2)(N), 12 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012). 
 296 Criddle, supra note 292, at 483–84. 
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a mandate that makes it clear that the ultimate purpose of financial stability 
regulation is to protect the broader economy, the courts (particularly the D.C. 
Circuit) may treat the financial system as an end in itself, and assess the 
FSOC’s actions from a more efficiency-oriented perspective that focuses on 
the costs that financial stability regulation imposes on the financial industry.297 
It is very difficult for financial stability regulation to survive an “arbitrary and 
capricious” review that is based on notions of efficiency and assessed by virtue 
of quantified cost–benefit analysis,298 and so the absence of a fulsome 
financial stability mandate gives opponents of financial stability regulation an 
upper hand in such litigation. Importantly, even the fear of such aggressive 
judicial review can be counterproductive in the context of financial stability 
regulation, to the extent that it encourages the FSOC to make timid 
recommendations that are less likely to be overturned by the courts, but more 
likely to unnecessarily complicate the financial system.299 
Finally, there are practical difficulties that could result from Dodd–Frank’s 
lack of clarity regarding “financial stability” and the FSOC’s mandate. For 
example, Dodd–Frank tethered together different permutations and 
combinations of financial regulatory agencies by requiring them to make joint 
rulemakings, and to coordinate on the supervision and enforcement of those 
rules.300 This type of agency coordination is made more difficult if the 
agencies have different understandings of what the legislation is trying to 
achieve. In addition, the FSOC’s currently articulated approach to financial 
stability—which emphasizes the ability of the financial system to absorb 
shocks as well as the absence of crisis—is inconsistent with the ad hoc 
approach recently articulated by the OFR, which uses the more limited 
“absence of crisis” conception of stability.301 Given that the OFR provides the 
FSOC with data regarding financial stability issues, it is easy to see that 
inconsistent informal approaches could cause problems with regard to the 
                                                                                                                     
 297 See Allen, supra note 31, at 176–77. 
 298 See supra text accompanying notes 144–49. For a discussion of how the 
professionalism and expertise of administrative agencies makes them worthy of, and 
legitimizes, deference, see Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative 
Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 486–91 
(2012). 
 299 C. F. LARRY HEIMANN, ACCEPTABLE RISKS: POLITICS, POLICY, AND RISKY 
TECHNOLOGIES 18 (1998); Allen, supra note 31, at 186–87. 
 300 Some notable examples include the multi-agency rulemaking made pursuant to 
section 619 of Dodd–Frank (the so-called “Volcker Rule”), and definitional rules relating 
to swaps made jointly by the SEC and CFTC pursuant to sections 112(a)(8), (d)(1), and 
712(d)(2)(B), (C) of Dodd–Frank. 
 301 The OFR has described financial stability as: “The condition in which the financial 
system is sufficiently functioning to provide its basic tasks for the economy even under 
stress.” OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 133 (2012), http://financial 
research.gov/annual-reports/files/office-of-financial-research-annual-report-2012.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/QG2K-BQ2W]. 
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overall assessment of risks to financial stability.302 A more fulsome legislative 
description of “financial stability” would generate more clarity and 
consistency in financial stability regulation. 
V. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
The previous Part identified a number of features of the FSOC and its 
mandate that are likely to impair the FSOC’s ability to promote financial 
stability. Given the importance of financial stability to society, this Part will 
consider potential reforms to improve the efficacy of financial stability 
regulation. While the political economy of financial stability regulation will 
remain (at least to some extent) a perennial problem, “buffers can be put in 
place to reduce unwarranted political pressure that can harm the public 
interest.”303 To this end, Part V.A argues for the abandonment of the FSOC 
and the creation of a stand-alone prudential regulator, with a sizable staff and 
budget, to address financial stability. This would be the “Cadillac” reform 
option, but there is clearly no political support for this type of radical reform at 
present. Part V.A. is thus best thought of as a thought experiment, which might 
inform reform efforts after the next crisis. Part V.B, on the other hand, 
explores a number of reforms that work within the existing U.S. financial 
regulatory framework. Again, it is unlikely that there is sufficient political will 
to implement any of these at present, but these proposals stand a stronger 
chance of being implemented as responses to future crises. 
A. A Stand-Alone Prudential Regulator 
The United States’ bewildering array of financial regulatory agencies is 
more a product of accident than of any conscious design.304 Although some 
have argued that the existing fragmented architecture has some benefits (in 
terms of creating competition amongst regulators, resulting in more 
specialized and efficient regulatory agencies),305 the predominant consensus is 
that the current structure makes little sense.306 As Part IV.A.iii explored, 
numerous coordination problems arise as a result of the division of financial 
stability regulation functions amongst these different regulatory agencies. 
                                                                                                                     
 302 Dodd–Frank Act § 153(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5343 (2012). 
 303 Barkow, supra note 243, at 79. 
 304 “The current regulatory structure for financial institutions in the United States 
developed in a piecemeal fashion over time, often in response to various financial and 
economic conditions existing in the past.” THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A 
MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 143 (Mar. 2008) [hereinafter BUSH 
BLUEPRINT], http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/BQY7-T7HA]. 
 305 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 77, at 65. 
 306 Id. at 63–64; John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The 
Significance of Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 BUS. 
LAW. 447, 481–82 (1995). 
2015] FINANCIAL STABILITY 1139 
However, in the wake of the Financial Crisis, there was no real attempt to 
consolidate responsibility for financial stability issues into a single regulatory 
body.307 Thus, for context regarding how a consolidated financial regulator 
might address financial stability issues, we need to look abroad. This Part will 
consider both the British and the Australian experiences with consolidated 
financial regulators, and the lessons they suggest for regulatory reform in the 
United States. 
The Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 consolidated supervision 
of the entire British financial industry in the Financial Services Authority (the 
FSA).308 As such, the FSA had responsibility for prudential stability concerns 
as well as for market conduct issues. Although consolidating all financial 
regulators into one might seem superficially appealing,309 in retrospect, it is 
clear that financial stability concerns were largely trumped by other regulatory 
objectives in the pre-Crisis FSA.310 The Turner Review, released in the wake 
of the Financial Crisis, indicated that the FSA favored efficiency over stability 
as a regulatory philosophy, and that that preference manifested itself in a 
laissez-faire, market discipline-based approach that often eschewed the 
interventionist regulation necessary as a prudential supervisor.311 There is a 
risk, then, that if the U.S. were to create a single financial regulator, “one type 
of regulation would come to dominate within [that] single regulator”312 and 
given that financial stability regulation fails to attract public attention in boom 
times, it is the type of regulation most likely to fall by the wayside.313 As 
Senator Collins pointed out in the debates regarding Dodd–Frank, “the 
experience in the United Kingdom demonstrates, [the consolidation of 
regulatory agencies into one] would be no guarantee that our Nation’s 
economy would be shielded from systemic risk.”314 The United Kingdom’s 
experience with the FSA cautions against the creation of a monolithic financial 
regulator in the United States; in fact, the FSA’s track record was so poor that 
                                                                                                                     
 307 Although the Bush Blueprint indicated that the twin peaks approach was the 
optimal one, it was never pursued. BUSH BLUEPRINT, supra note 304, at 143. Obama’s 
original proposal instead fixed on the notion of creating a council of regulators to deal with 
systemic risk. OBAMA WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 3. Susan Collins, a Republican who 
supported financial reform, agreed that a council of regulators was the best approach: “To 
my mind, the President’s decision to rely on a council model makes his proposal far more 
practical and effective than alternatives which would have required the restructuring of 
most or all of the financial agencies that currently oversee the financial system.” 111 
CONG. REC. S6,682 (daily ed. June 17, 2009) (statement of Sen. Collins) [hereinafter 
Collins Statement]. 
 308 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8, §§ 1–2 (UK). 
 309 For a discussion of the arguments advanced in support of the creation of the FSA 
(including efficiency and economies of scale), see Taylor, supra note 80, at 73–78. 
 310 THE TURNER REVIEW, supra note 136, at 87. 
 311 Id. 
 312 Taylor, supra note 80, at 82. 
 313 Id. at 81. 
 314 Collins Statement, supra note 307, at S6,682. 
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it was entirely restructured by the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Act of 
2012.315 
Instead, many have concluded that the so-called “twin peaks” model is 
best calculated to ensure a regulatory focus on financial stability issues.316 The 
twin peaks model involves the creation of two distinct regulatory bodies: one 
with responsibility for prudential regulation of all financial institutions, and 
the other with responsibility for market conduct regulation (in each case, 
without regard for the legal form of the financial institutions being regulated, 
thus limiting the potential for regulatory arbitrage).317 Because the prudential 
regulatory body is not distracted by any primary responsibility for efficiency 
or other market conduct issues, it is structured in a way that maximizes the 
likelihood that it will maintain a long-term focus on financial stability.318 
Furthermore, a prudential agency that regulates a broad range of activities and 
firms (rather than splitting jurisdiction along the lines of banking, securities, 
derivatives, and insurance—as is currently the case in the United States) might 
be less susceptible to capture, because it is less beholden to the worldview of 
any one segment of the financial industry.319 
A form of the twin peaks model was implemented in the United Kingdom 
in 2013, when two bodies (the Prudential Regulatory Authority and the 
Financial Conduct Authority) replaced the FSA.320 These agencies are too new 
to offer much guidance to the United States at present. However, the twin 
peaks model has a much longer history in Australia, which adopted the model 
in 1998 with the creation of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA)321 and the restructuring of the Australian Securities & Investments 
                                                                                                                     
 315 Financial Services Act 2012, c. 21, § 6 (UK). 
 316 The Bush Blueprint concluded that “The optimal objectives-based regulatory 
structure . . . somewhat resembles the model adopted in Australia.” BUSH BLUEPRINT, 
supra note 304, at 143. In addition, a report by the Group of 30 noted that: “There is a 
growing interest in and support for ‘regulation by objective’ of the Twin Peaks Approach 
to supervision.” GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: 
APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 14 (2008) [hereinafter G30 
REPORT], http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/The%20Structure%20of%20Financial%20 
Supervision.pdf [http://perma.cc/CW8C-CCVR]. 
 317 Taylor, supra note 80, at 78. 
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 319 Barkow, supra note 243, at 50; Elizabeth F. Brown, A Comparison of the Handling 
of the Financial Crisis in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, 55 VILL. L. 
REV. 509, 563 (2010). 
 320 Financial Services Act 2012, c. 21, §§ 2, 6 (UK). 
 321 “[APRA] is the prudential regulator of the Australian financial services industry. It 
oversees banks, credit unions, building societies, general insurance and reinsurance 
companies, life insurance, private health insurance, friendly societies, and most of the 
superannuation industry. . . . It was established on 1 July 1998.” About APRA, AUSTL. 
PRUDENTIAL REG. AUTHORITY, http://apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Pages/Default.aspx [http:// 
perma.cc/7MUU-92DJ]. 
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Commission (ASIC).322 APRA has had a good track record with regard to 
financial stability since that time: no Australian banks suffered losses, nor did 
Australia drop into recession, as a result of the Financial Crisis.323 Of course, 
there were other mitigating factors that help explain why Australia emerged 
from the Financial Crisis relatively unscathed,324 and it is impossible to 
disentangle the impact of Australia’s regulatory structure from these other 
mitigating factors. Nonetheless, there are a number of APRA’s features that 
seem calculated to produce an agency conducive to financial stability 
regulation. The remainder of this Part will explore how these features could be 
replicated (and supplemented) in the United States to create a stand-alone 
prudential regulatory agency that is most likely to take the proactive, long-
term regulatory approach so necessary to financial stability regulation. 
To implement the twin peaks approach in the United States, the FSOC, 
OCC, FDIC, SEC, CFTC, CFPB, and NCUA would all be abolished. In their 
place would be created two new agencies—a market conduct and consumer 
protection regulator (similar to Australia’s ASIC), and a stand-alone prudential 
regulator (similar to Australia’s APRA). This Article is concerned primarily 
with financial stability and thus focuses only on the design of the latter agency, 
which would be a federal agency with prudential authority over all institutions 
carrying out financial activities (including insurance activities), no matter what 
the form of the legal entity carrying out those activities.325 
Implementing the twin peaks model in the United States should also entail 
denuding the Federal Reserve of its function as a bank supervisor and of its 
authority under Dodd–Frank to supervise SIFIs326 (the Australian central 
bank—the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA)—does not actively supervise 
financial institutions).327 This would diminish Federal Reserve dominance in 
financial stability matters, potentially making regulation in the United States 
less bank-centric. The Federal Reserve would remain responsible for monetary 
policy, and would also retain its lender-of-last-resort function,328 but it would 
fulfill such functions with information provided by the newly created 
                                                                                                                     
 322 “In 1998 the organisation took on responsibility for consumer protection in 
superannuation, insurance and deposit taking and was renamed the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission.” How We Operate, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, 
http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/how-we-operate/ [http://perma.cc/XU7Q-553N] 
(last updated May 15, 2015). 
 323 Brown, supra note 319, at 519, 521, 550. 
 324 For a fulsome exploration of the many factors that influenced Australia’s superior 
performance during the Financial Crisis, see Jennifer G. Hill, Why Did Australia Fare So 
Well in the Global Financial Crisis?, in THE REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 203, 244 n.300 (Eilís Ferran et al. eds., 2012). 
 325 Such a restructuring could limit opportunities for institutional regulatory arbitrage, 
and the growth of the shadow banking industry. 
 326 Dodd–Frank Act § 165, 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012). 
 327 G30 REPORT, supra note 316, at 40. 
 328 For a summary of the Federal Reserve’s current functions, see CARNELL ET AL., 
supra note 77, at 61. 
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prudential regulator, rather than gathering such information itself in the course 
of its supervision. While there are many who argue strenuously that “the 
information acquired in the capacity of . . . supervisor [is] essential to the 
central bank performing the lender-of-last-resort function”329 given that 
systemic risks can arise all over the financial system (and not just within the 
banks and SIFIs that the Federal Reserve currently regulates),330 it is naïve to 
think that the Federal Reserve can gather all the information it needs to 
discharge its lender-of-last-resort functions through its own supervisory 
function. Instead, like the RBA in Australia, the Federal Reserve should rely 
on Memoranda of Understanding and close cooperation with the prudential 
regulatory agency (and others) to ensure that it has the necessary information 
to determine when it should exercise its lender-of-last-resort function.331 
Following the restructuring proposed in this Part, the Secretary of the 
Treasury would no longer have an official role within the agency dedicated to 
financial stability. This would alleviate the concerns previously raised about 
the Secretary of the Treasury politicizing financial stability regulation.332 
Furthermore, the OFR would be removed from the Treasury (where it 
currently resides) and relocated within the new stand-alone prudential agency. 
In such context, the OFR may be able to achieve its promise as a “regulatory 
contrarian.”333 Insulated from the more politicized Treasury, it would 
presumably have more freedom to raise unpopular arguments and issues in a 
way that disrupts groupthink about where systemic risks lie.334 In addition, 
Barkow has noted that the ability of an agency to generate and disseminate 
information is key to retaining public support:335 an effective OFR could 
release information in a way that assists in maintaining a positive public 
profile for financial stability regulation and the new prudential agency. 
In terms of structuring the new prudential agency itself, there are a number 
of APRA’s features that should be emulated. For example, APRA’s members 
are appointed by the executive rather than being elected officials336 and can 
only be terminated for certain specified causes.337 To ensure the independence 
of a stand-alone United States prudential regulator, these features should be 
                                                                                                                     
 329 Taylor, supra note 80, at 84; see also G30 REPORT, supra note 316, at 40. 
 330 See supra text accompanying notes 75–80. Regarding the potential for smaller 
financial institutions to destabilize the financial system, see Stiglitz, supra note 97, at 17. 
 331 There is a Memorandum of Understanding between APRA and the RBA regarding 
cooperation and coordination in instances involving threats to the financial system’s 
stability. G30 REPORT, supra note 316, at 195. 
 332 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 333 McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 91, at 1670. 
 334 Id. at 1647–48. 
 335 Barkow, supra note 243, at 59. 
 336 See Gadinis, supra note 176, at 336. The members of APRA are appointed by the 
Australian Governor-General, on the recommendation of the Treasurer. G30 REPORT, 
supra note 316, at 191. 
 337 Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority Act 1998 s 25(2) (Austl.). 
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replicated.338 This would ensure that the stand-alone regulator would be more 
apolitical than the current FSOC, which is rendered susceptible to the vagaries 
of political economy by the prominence of the Secretary of the Treasury 
within the council.339 Such an approach should not be considered unusual or 
controversial; at present, the heads of most of the existing financial regulatory 
agencies in the United States are appointed, and can only be removed for 
cause.340 What is likely to be controversial is whether the new agency should 
be headed by a single director or a multi-member commission; this was a 
matter of heated debate in the context of the founding of the CFPB.341 There 
are, of course, benefits and drawbacks to both approaches. Multi-member 
commissions can be viewed as promoting collegiality and deal making, or 
decried as promoting inaction and wasteful horse-trading.342 While a single 
director is more likely to be efficient and accountable than a group of 
commissioners, he or she brings only one perspective to the position, and is 
also potentially more susceptible to capture.343 
On balance, this Article recommends following APRA,344 and 
implementing a multi-member commission for the new agency.345 One of the 
                                                                                                                     
 338 In the United States, “the defining hallmark of an independent agency is that it is 
headed by someone who cannot be removed at will by the President but instead can be 
removed only for good cause.” Barkow, supra note 243, at 16. 
 339 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 340 Barkow, supra note 243, at 29. 
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multi-member commission is less likely to be efficient than an agency with a single 
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number of federal financial regulatory agencies from eight to two, even with a multi-
member commission, it is still a net positive from an efficiency perspective (a move to a 
single agency would also cut down on wasteful turf battles between existing financial 
regulatory agencies). The biggest concern in terms of instituting a multi-member 
commission to govern the new prudential regulatory agency is the risk of shirking—it is 
harder to hold multi-member commissions accountable than single directors. Id. However, 
this trade-off seems worthwhile given that a multi-member commission best allows for the 
broad range of perspectives necessary for effective financial stability regulation. Barkow, 
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key arguments of this Article is that, when dealing with financial stability, 
regulatory imagination and a broad-view perspective are vital. These are more 
likely to be achieved with multiple commissioners with heterogeneous 
perspectives than with a single director.346 Ideally, the new agency would be 
structured so that each commissioner would represent a different area of 
expertise: one member could be drawn from a pool of qualified persons with 
banking expertise, another could be drawn from a pool with securities 
expertise, another would have insurance expertise, another derivatives 
expertise, and another experience with funds. There should also be sufficient 
flexibility to include new areas of financial expertise as they evolve. The 
commissioners should be somewhat balanced in terms of political party 
affiliations, as research indicates that “a group composed solely of 
ideologically like-minded people tends toward extreme decision making.”347 
Each of the commissioners should be required to testify before Congress on a 
regular basis, so that no one commissioner dominates the new agency’s 
messaging, and in a similar vein, it would be helpful if the role of chairing the 
commission and setting its agenda could rotate amongst the commissioners. If 
the new agency were structured such that each year, a commissioner with a 
different type of expertise would set the agency’s priorities, then that would 
maximize the chance of different perspectives being heard in the long run. 
Typically, multi-member commissions of independent agencies are 
appointed with “the advice and consent of the Senate.”348 Thought should thus 
be given as to which Senate committee would oversee the appointment 
process, and indeed which committee should oversee the new agency in 
general. Given the desire to break the bank-centric mentality that currently 
informs financial stability regulation, it would be best if the new agency did 
not operate under the aegis of the Senate Banking Committee. Instead, a 
committee with a broader purview, such as the Finance Committee, should 
oversee the new prudential regulatory agency. Preferably, a public-minded 
subcommittee on financial stability would be established within the Finance 
Committee for the purpose of overseeing financial stability and the new 
agency, so that the agency’s political overseers are less likely to focus solely 
on appeasing financial industry interests.349 
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 348 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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The leadership structure of the new agency is important, but the new 
agency’s method of funding will also be key to ensuring its focus on the public 
interest. The new agency would require a robust staff (including the OFR) to 
discharge its functions, and reliance on either the President or Congress for 
funding to support that staff would compromise the independence of the 
prudential regulator.350 Instead, funding should be levied from industry fees 
(APRA is similarly funded).351 Admittedly, past experience has shown that 
reliance on industry fees made regulators like the OCC and the OTS more 
susceptible to industry capture.352 However, the OCC and OTS were 
competing to implement ever-laxer regulation in order to attract institutions to 
charter with them (and thus expand their influence and funding pools)—
resulting in pervasive capture and a deregulatory “race to the bottom.”353 If a 
new prudential regulatory agency were created, financial institutions would 
have no choice as to whether they would be regulated by it, and so there would 
be no competition for the industry’s favor in order to attract funding. 
Independence from elected officials could thus be bolstered without increasing 
dependence on the financial industry. 
Finally, the statutory mandate of the new agency is also important. APRA 
is directed “to balance the objectives of financial safety and efficiency, 
competition, contestability and competitive neutrality and, in balancing these 
objectives, is to promote financial system stability in Australia.”354 While this 
mandate does include a statutory direction to consider efficiency concerns, 
APRA is directed to prioritize financial stability concerns. Granting the United 
States prudential regulator a similar paramount financial stability mandate can 
assist in training regulatory focus on financial stability (even in normal and 
boom times), and in fostering a public-focused regulatory identity. As Kwak 
has noted, “[s]omeone who identifies as an economically sophisticated steward 
of efficient financial markets will adopt different policy positions from 
someone who identifies as a defender of the ‘little guy.’”355 A statutory charge 
to protect the public from the fallout from financial instability would thus 
frame the agency’s decision-making in a different light. The example of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is instructive here356: the EPA is 
often cited as an administrative agency that identifies primarily with the 
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interests of the public,357 and is thus less susceptible to cognitive capture by its 
regulated industries on issues like clean air regulation.358 In a similar vein, 
Wilmarth has argued that, when compared with other banking regulators, the 
FDIC has exhibited fewer signs of capture,359 partially because of the FDIC’s 
“clearly defined mission” as the protector of the little guys (depositors) and of 
a public good (the Deposit Insurance Fund).360 
Of course, if we assume that regulators are motivated entirely by self-
interest, then a financial stability mandate would make little difference to how 
regulators carry out their jobs, (at least in normal times, when the costs of 
financial instability are not particularly salient to the public at large, and there 
is thus little reputational cost to abandoning stability efforts).361 Purely self-
interested regulators, for example, might purposefully defer to industry 
interests in drafting and enforcing regulations in order to avoid conflict with 
the industry (i.e., prefer their own self-interest in an “easy life”), or to procure 
an industry job in the future.362 However, we should be careful about how 
much credence is given to this assumption about self-interest. There is 
empirical research that indicates that regulatory agencies will often actively 
prefer the longer term public interest to their own short-term self-interest.363 
To the extent that regulators genuinely identify with the benefits of long-term 
financial stability, taking actions that instead prioritize the short-term 
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 358 For a discussion of the EPA’s decision to tighten restrictions on ozone and 
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 361 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 72, at 97 n.174; Short, supra note 83, at 652. 
 362 Omarova, supra note 291, at 630. 
 363 See Bradley, supra note 166, at 778. 
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profitability of the financial industry will cause them troubling cognitive 
dissonance.364 
Overall, then, there is much to be gained from creating a stand-alone 
prudential regulatory agency in the United States. The mere act of shaking up 
the existing financial regulatory structure, where many of the agencies have 
demonstrated a strong culture of capture,365 could have salutary effects. 
However, the United States has proven consistently stubborn about 
rationalizing its financial regulatory architecture.366 Recognizing that such 
rationalization may be a bridge too far, the next section will therefore consider 
the possibility of leaving the United States’ existing financial regulatory 
structure largely intact, but making changes (some limited, some more drastic) 
to improve regulatory focus on financial stability. 
B. Working Within the Existing Regulatory Framework 
There are a number of changes to Dodd–Frank that would help legitimize 
and increase the salience of the FSOC’s efforts to promote financial stability. 
For example, section 112(a)(1)(B) would ideally be repealed, allowing the 
FSOC to work on formalizing, in advance, ex post safety nets designed to 
mitigate future crises. Most importantly, though, financial stability should be 
defined, in order to authorize the exercise of regulatory discretion in a way that 
prioritizes the interests of society as a whole in financial stability. To this end, 
Dodd–Frank should be amended to include something akin to the following 
definition of financial stability: 
The term “financial stability” shall mean a state of affairs wherein 
(i) financial institutions and markets are able to facilitate capital 
intermediation, risk management, and payment services in a way that enables 
sustainable economic growth; (ii) there is no disruption to the ability of 
financial institutions or markets to carry out such functions that might cause 
harm to persons (wherever they may be resident) who are not customers or 
counterparties of those financial institutions, nor participants in those 
financial markets; and (iii) financial institutions and markets are able to 
withstand economic shocks (such as the failure of other markets and 
institutions, or a chain of significant loses at financial institutions) so that (x) 
there will be no disruption to the performance of the functions set forth in (i) 
and (y) no harm will be caused to the persons set forth in (ii).367 
Admittedly, a mandate to pursue financial stability, defined as per this 
Part, would not be overly prescriptive. This may be dissatisfying for some, 
who might seek more precise direction for the FSOC as to how to proceed in 
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achieving financial stability368—perhaps by using a quantitative metric that 
indicates precisely when the financial system is and is not stable, and when 
intervention is and is not required. However, there are perils inherent in 
hewing too closely to mandates that are simple to follow, but do not accurately 
reflect the real risks inherent in the financial system.369 In reality, a need for 
regulatory discretion is inevitable when dealing with complex subject 
matter.370 This Part’s proposed definition of financial stability seeks to strike a 
balance such that the financial stability mandate is “neither excessively self-
confident about what we know about financial stability so as to produce 
unfortunate unintended consequences, nor excessively tentative so as to fail to 
take steps to counter the very real risks that do exist.”371 
Turning from the FSOC’s mandate to its structure, the key purpose of any 
structural reform should be to increase the participation, commitment and 
accountability of the FSOC’s voting members (particularly those other than 
the Federal Reserve and the Treasury) with respect to financial stability 
matters. There are a number of incremental reforms that could assist in 
focusing agencies on financial stability issues. For example, section 112(b) of 
Dodd–Frank currently requires the FSOC’s voting members to submit signed 
statements certifying their belief that the FSOC, the government, and the 
private sector “are taking all reasonable steps to ensure financial stability and 
to mitigate systemic risk that would negatively affect the economy.”372 While 
on its face it might seem that this certification would hold the voting members 
accountable for financial stability issues, the phrasing of the certification is 
important—it does not require a voting member to certify that their agency, 
independently, is taking steps to promote financial stability. Pursuant to 
section 112(b), the voting member is merely stating his or her belief as to the 
actions of the FSOC, over which he or she has no controlling influence. Here, 
it would be beneficial to follow the lead of section 302 of the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act373 and alter the certification such that it requires the voting member to 
take, at least symbolically, personal responsibility for their agency’s 
commitment to financial stability matters. The signed statement should be 
required to refer to satisfaction with the agency’s own efforts to promote 
                                                                                                                     
 368 The purported precision of the efficiency mandate, as measured by cost–benefit 
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financial stability, as well as the efforts of the FSOC, the government, and the 
private sector. 
The Congressional hearing required by section 112(a)(2)(N) of Dodd–
Frank could be adapted to a similar end.374 That section requires the Treasury 
Secretary, on behalf of the FSOC, to testify before Congress each year 
regarding “potential emerging threats to the financial stability of the United 
States.”375 This requirement could be expanded such that all of the FSOC’s 
voting members (and not just the Treasury Secretary) are required to appear 
together before Congress at this annual hearing, and field questions regarding 
financial stability. In doing so, the FSOC’s voting members would not only 
maintain the salience of financial stability issues for themselves, they would 
also play an educative role,376 informing the legislature and the public at large 
about risks arising in the non-bank corners of the financial system. 
Thus far, this Part has discussed reforms that merely tinker around the 
edges of Dodd–Frank. While helpful, these are limited in their ability to 
address the key problem that arises when an express financial stability 
mandate is given to a council of regulatory agency leaders, but not to the 
agencies themselves: if the agencies are not concerned with financial stability 
issues, then a council of their leaders is unlikely to be effective in pursuing 
financial stability.377 A more radical approach would be to give all of the 
federal financial regulatory agencies express statutory mandates to pursue 
financial stability. The arguments for giving each federal financial agency a 
financial stability mandate largely echo arguments that have already been 
made in favor of a fulsome financial stability mandate for the FSOC, and for 
an APRA-style prudential regulator. For example, conferring a statutory 
financial stability mandate on each of the agencies (especially when coupled 
with a requirement to regularly testify before Congress as to how the agency is 
satisfying such mandate) could mitigate the political economy of financial 
stability regulation by training regulatory attention on financial stability issues 
even in normal and boom times, when the public is largely oblivious to such 
issues.378 The mandate could also permit the agencies to develop broader, 
simpler, rules that are better calculated to promote stability than rules that deal 
too granularly with the minutiae of financial activities—with less fear of 
rebuke from the D.C. Circuit.379 Finally, the mandate could be instrumental in 
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fostering public-focused regulatory identities, rendering financial regulators 
less susceptible to lobbying and cognitive capture.380 
While the reforms discussed in this Part seek to work within the United 
States’ existing regulatory framework, there are two structural reforms that 
would be required to make the FSOC a truly effective coordination 
mechanism. First, the Treasury Secretary should be removed from his or her 
position of prominence within the FSOC. Instead, the FSOC should be chaired 
by an independent, separately funded Chairperson who is appointed by the 
President, and can only be removed for cause.381 (This was, in fact, the 
approach that Senator Collins favored at the time Dodd–Frank was being 
debated. She argued that the Treasury Secretary should not chair the FSOC, 
and that the independence of the FSOC should be preserved by appointing a 
Chairperson who would be unaffiliated with the Treasury, or any of the 
FSOC’s member agencies)382 Not only would such a reform reduce some of 
the political pressures on the FSOC, the new independent FSOC chairperson 
could also function as a type of regulatory contrarian.383 One criticism that has 
been leveled at the FSOC is that it will not address failures of imagination 
about financial stability and systemic risk “if the personnel in the [FSOC] are 
simply recycled regulators and central bankers.”384 However, if the 
Chairperson of the FSOC (together with his or her staff) were drawn from 
outside the traditional pool of financial regulators, they could bring new 
methodologies and philosophies to the task, which could help break regulatory 
groupthink about where the risks to financial stability lie.385 
The second structural reform required is that insurance needs to be 
regulated at the federal level. Insurance has traditionally been regulated by the 
states, and although Dodd–Frank now requires the President to appoint to the 
FSOC an independent member with insurance expertise,386 and also 
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established a Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within the Treasury 
Department,387 state regulators still retain primacy in this area of the law.388 
Unfortunately, state-level regulation is not particularly conducive to dealing 
with systemic risks and financial instability, given that the negative 
consequences of in-state activity are externalized throughout the country (and 
internationally).389 To ensure a focus on the systemic risks that the insurance 
industry can create, a federal regulator is needed,390 and a financial stability 
mandate should be conferred on such regulator. 
The FSOC could be an extremely useful coordination and communication 
authority if it were working with a group of financial regulatory agencies that 
were truly committed to addressing threats to financial stability in all of their 
potentially different manifestations. Even if one or two member agencies were 
to attempt to shirk their newly-created statutory responsibilities for financial 
stability, the other member agencies—now charged with an express statutory 
obligation to address financial instability that they must fulfill or be held 
accountable for neglecting—would be more likely to exert the FSOC’s power 
under section 120 of Dodd–Frank to bring the shirking agencies into line. 
Short of implementing such financial stability mandates, however, it is likely 
that most of the FSOC’s members will abdicate responsibility for financial 
stability issues in normal and boom times, leaving (at most) only the Federal 
Reserve to monitor and address perceived threats to financial stability. 
To be clear, this Part’s proposal to give all federal regulators a financial 
stability mandate is inferior to the creation of an APRA-style prudential 
regulator. Each of the existing federal financial agencies has a pre-existing 
mandate over which the new financial stability mandate would be overlaid, 
and just as with the FSA in the UK, it may be that the pre-existing mandates 
will be prioritized over the new financial stability mandate.391 Furthermore, 
the jurisdictions of the existing regulators tend to be delineated by industry, 
and focus on a particular type of industry makes the agency more susceptible 
                                                                                                                     
 387 Id. § 502(a). 
 388 Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz stated: 
The FIO has no regulatory authority over the insurance industry[, and has only a very 
limited power to preempt state law when it determines those laws conflict with 
international legal agreements]. Instead, the FIO’s principal role is to serve as a 
federal monitor of the insurance industry and state regulation and to “coordinate 
Federal efforts and develop Federal policy on prudential aspects of international 
insurance matters.” 
Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 76, at 1590 (footnote omitted) (quoting Dodd–Frank 
Act § 313(c)(1)(E)). 
 389 Id. at 1627. 
 390 Schwarcz and Schwarcz have therefore argued that the FIO should be given 
expanded powers to regulate for systemic risk. Id. at 1634–39. Although the location of the 
FIO within the politicized Treasury is grounds for some concern, this Article generally 
supports the federalization of insurance regulation. 
 391 See supra text accompanying notes 309–13. 
1152 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:5 
to capture than a stand-alone regulator with sweeping jurisdiction would be.392 
Nonetheless, giving each financial regulator a statutory charge to monitor and 
address threats to financial stability is preferable to the status quo, where the 
federal financial regulatory agencies have (at best) implicit charges to consider 
financial stability issues.393 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Financial stability is a vital public good, and it is precisely when the 
economy is booming that the foundations for financial stability must be laid 
(for example, by restricting profitable but potentially destabilizing activities, 
or by formalizing ex post safety nets in anticipation of future instability, or by 
implementing restrictive countercyclical regulation in the face of warning 
signs of impending instability). However, the FSOC, as a body with limited 
resources and powers of its own, will be unable to aggressively pursue 
financial stability without the committed assistance of its member agencies. 
While the Federal Reserve does seem committed—at least at present—to 
pursuing financial stability, it is suboptimal for the Federal Reserve (informed 
as it is by its bank-centric perspective) to have a monopoly on financial 
stability regulation. Instead, the other financial regulatory agencies, which 
have information and expertise about disparate corners of the financial system, 
should also be actively involved in promoting financial stability. However, 
there is little incentive for them to do so, given that they have no express 
mandate or statutory instructions to pursue financial stability, and as the 
economy improves, any efforts to this end are likely to receive little public 
support—and harsh criticism from the financial industry. Unless the financial 
stability regulatory structure is altered to ensure that there is a substantive and 
independent regulatory body (or bodies) committed to, and accountable for, 
monitoring and addressing threats to financial stability, the United States will 
remain unnecessarily exposed to future financial crises—which will harm 
those outside of the financial system more than those within it. 
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